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1 Motivation 
Today, most large nonfinancial corporations use financial derivatives. While derivatives can be effec-
tive and efficient tools for corporate hedging, they are equally well suited for speculative purposes, 
possibly even under the guise of hedging. In surveys, firms surprisingly admit to speculative uses of 
derivatives. For example, 50% of 1,161 global firms indicate that the firm’s market view is important 
for their use of derivatives (Bodnar, Graham, Harvey and Marston, 2014), close to 50% of 229 firms 
from 36 countries indicate that they take active positions at least some of the time (Lins, Servaes and 
Tamayo, 2011), and two out of three U.S. firms alter the size or the timing of a hedge depending on 
their market view on exchange rates or interest rates (Bodnar, Hayt and Marston, 1998). Given low 
currency volatility, many firms that used to hedge their currency exposure currently opt to live with 
the risk based on the assumption that rates will move within a limited range (Economist 2014), illus-
trating that firms take views on direction and volatility of exchange rates. 
For various stakeholders, it is important to know for what purpose nonfinancial firms employ 
derivatives and what the consequences are, as corporate derivatives usage may decrease (in the case 
of hedging) or increase (in the case of speculation) the risk characteristics of a company’s stock and 
consequently affect its value. Regulators also concern themselves with the potential role of derivatives 
in accounting scandals as well as broader issues of market stability, not least because of the role that 
the use of derivatives by financial institutions played in the recent financial crisis. The investor Warren 
Buffett is even often cited as condemning derivatives as “financial weapons of mass destruction.” At 
the same time, it is important to understand the effect that reduced availability and higher costs of 
derivatives as a consequence of new regulation of OTC derivatives is likely going to have on the 
behavior of end-users (ISDA, 2015). 
Despite its potential importance, only a few studies investigate the effect of derivatives usage 
on firm risk and exposures. These studies have almost exclusively looked at U.S. firms, and their 
conclusions are mixed. Hentschel and Kothari (2001) find few, if any, differences in risk between 
derivatives users and non-users in the United States, while Guay (1999) finds a slight reduction in the 
risk of U.S. firms that initiate the use of derivatives, and Nguyen and Faff (2010) find a reduction in 
risk only for moderate derivatives users in Australia. The results of Allayannis and Ofek (2001) are 
also consistent with the use of derivatives for hedging, and Bartram, Brown and Conrad (2011) find 
global evidence that firms hedge downside risk. However, Chernenko and Faulkender (2011) and 
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Faulkender (2005) identify evidence of speculation (market timing) in firms’ interest rate risk manage-
ment practices, and Géczy, Minton, and Schrand (2007) find that frequent speculators have signifi-
cantly lower return volatility than non-speculators and sometimes speculators.1 
Since the consequences of derivatives use on firm risk are potentially important to a variety of 
stakeholders of the firm, and amid the limited and mixed existing evidence, this paper provides new, 
comprehensive evidence on the question of whether firms in different parts of the world are reducing 
or taking risks with derivatives. The analysis is based on a sample of 6,896 nonfinancial firms from 47 
countries, using a unique dataset of global derivatives usage. In particular, we investigate the systematic 
impact of the use of exchange rate (FX), interest rate (IR) and commodity price (CP) derivatives on 
the risk characteristics of nonfinancial firms. Our main measures of financial risk and exposures are 
the standard deviation of stock returns (scaled by the standard deviation of the returns of the local 
market index), as well as stock price exposure to market, exchange rate, interest rate and commodity 
price risk. If firms are using derivative financial instruments for hedging purposes, derivatives users 
may exhibit lower or similar levels of risk by these measures (see e.g. Hentschel and Kothari, 2001; 
Allayannis and Ofek, 2001).2 In contrast, speculative uses of derivatives would be consistent with 
higher risk, e.g. higher stock return volatility, for derivatives users. 
Studying the use of derivatives on an international scale is important, because U.S. nonfinan-
cial firms account for only a minority of global derivatives transactions. Moreover, the global coverage 
of firms has three main advantages for studying the use and effects of derivatives. First, it increases 
the statistical power of tests compared to previous studies due to a larger sample size and more cross-
sectional variation. Second, the international sample allows studying different countries side by side in 
a consistent, coherent and fully comparable way. Since previous research has focused on few individual 
countries (mostly the United States) and has used different data sources, sample definitions, method-
ologies, model specifications, variable measurements, etc., the comparability of results across different 
studies is limited. Especially from a policy perspective, it is important to understand how general the 
motivations for and effects of derivatives usage are. To illustrate, in 2015, around 40% of end-users 
                                                 
1 Koski and Pontiff (1999) show that mutual funds that use derivatives have similar risk exposure and return performance 
to non-users, while Chen (2011) finds that hedge funds that use derivatives exhibit on average lower fund risks (e.g., 
market risk, downside risk, and event risk). 
2 Hedging (speculation) is defined as a policy that reduces (increases) firm value exposure to a market risk factor. An 
unintended increase in firm risk associated with hedging using derivatives should bias against finding a negative relation 
between derivatives and risk (Nguyen and Faff, 2010). 
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of derivatives are concerned about the scope of cross-border derivatives regulation (ISDA, 2015). 
Third, the international sample allows studying the role of country characteristics. Cross-country var-
iation in the effect of derivatives on risk characteristics is likely related to country-specific factors such 
as country risk, the strength of country-level corporate governance and access to derivatives markets. 
Country characteristics are new, important determinants of corporate derivatives usage. Previous re-
search has not been able to investigate these dimensions, even though they are potentially very inter-
esting and relevant since they can be influenced by policy. 
The study adds to the existing literature along several dimensions. First, it studies a sample of 
firms from a large number of countries, while previous work has focused on firms in the United States. 
Importantly, most of the results are clear and strong, compared to weaker and more mixed findings 
across previous research. Moreover, the limited analysis of derivatives usage internationally allows to 
effectively conduct out-of-sample tests of prior results where they exist. We provide, for the first time, 
evidence for a number of different non-U.S. countries based on systematically and consistently col-
lected data. In contrast to prior work, we consider a wide range of firm-level and country-level 
measures of risk and exposure, derivatives for different types of underlyings, as well as net and gross 
exposures for firms in the largest countries outside the United States. These countries are more im-
portant with regard to derivatives usage, both in terms of turnover as well as the propensity of firms 
to employ these instruments, and given institutional differences across countries, the effect of deriva-
tives usage on firm risk and exposure might vary from country to country. 
The results show, for the first time, that the motives for the use of derivatives are surprisingly 
homogenous across countries when taking a comparable approach. Studying country samples side by 
side, we show that the effect of derivatives on firm risk is also similar. Thus, in contrast to mixed 
evidence across prior studies, the results yield a clear bottom line, which is important for policy design. 
At the same time, the strong results for the pooled sample demonstrate the importance of sample size. 
Moreover, the study is the first to demonstrate how country-level governance and access to derivatives 
moderates the effect of derivatives on firm risk and exposures. These results are entirely new, but 
important since they inform the current policy debate regarding the regulation of derivatives markets. 
Moreover, influential policy makers have recently suggested that access to derivatives can enhance 
macroeconomic development. 
The results strongly suggest that nonfinancial firms use derivatives to reduce risk. Users of 
derivatives are more exposed to exchange rate risk and interest rate risk before the potential effects of 
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hedging are considered (gross or pre-hedging exposure). They are also more likely to belong to com-
modity-based industries that are exposed to commodity price risk. However, derivatives users show 
stock return volatilities that are 21% lower than volatilities of non-users. By the same token, firms that 
use derivatives also have significantly lower market betas as well as lower or similar levels of net (or 
post-hedging) foreign exchange rate, interest rate and commodity price exposures. These findings are 
consistent with hedging motives for corporate derivatives use, but not with corporate speculation with 
derivatives. The results persist after controlling for other factors that prior studies have identified as 
determinants of firm risk (e.g., size, profitability, etc.), the level of gross exposure (e.g. foreign sales), 
as well as country risk as measured by exchange rate and interest rate volatility, political risk and trade 
dependency. 
Firms with international business (i.e. that have foreign sales, foreign income or foreign assets) 
exhibit significantly lower foreign exchange rate exposure of their stock returns if they use currency 
derivatives. While the motivation to use currency derivatives is less clear a priori for firms without 
foreign business, there is no difference between the currency exposure of derivatives users and non-
users, and thus also no evidence of firms speculating with FX derivatives. These results differ in im-
portant ways from existing evidence in the literature, which has focused on the use of derivatives by 
U.S. firms with foreign business. In contrast, the focus of our analysis here is on firms that have no 
international business activities, which raises the interesting question of why they are using currency 
derivatives to start with. We also investigate potential endogeneity problems between the use of de-
rivatives and measures of firm risk. While the use of derivatives is affected (among other things) by 
the risk and exposure of a firm, the finding of a negative impact of derivatives use on the risk and 
exposures of firms that use derivatives is robust to estimation techniques such as instrumental varia-
bles and simultaneous equations. The results are also exist when using a treatment effects model to 
account for a potential self-selection bias. 
Overall, there is no evidence of corporate speculation with derivatives for different types of 
derivative instruments, since derivatives users always have lower or similar levels of risk and exposure, 
except for a marginally higher net commodity price exposure among firms using commodity price 
derivatives, which is consistent with commodity price risk being closely related to the operating busi-
ness and thus the competitive advantage of nonfinancial firms. The results are also present in subsam-
ples of individual countries. In fact, there are notably few differences across countries in the determi-
nants of derivatives usage as well as in the effect of derivatives use on measures of firm risk, which is 
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important in the context of current regulatory efforts (e.g. with regard to the regulation/clearing of 
OTC Derivatives markets), entailing that harmonized policy and regulation across countries may be 
adequate. In contrast, the majority of end-users of derivatives believe that market fragmentation along 
geographic lines as a result of the regulatory framework being put into place in key jurisdictions is 
likely going to have a negative impact on their ability to manage risk (ISDA, 2015). While these results 
may appear plausible and intuitive, they are by no means obvious, given the role of derivatives in the 
recent financial crisis, the indication of speculation in surveys, and the mixed and controversial existing 
empirical evidence from academic research of U.S. firms. 
Corporate governance has some clear implications for risk management decisions and the use 
of derivatives for hedging and speculation. In particular, stronger shareholder rights should better 
align the interests of managers and shareholders and prevent managers’ speculation with derivatives 
that is not in the interest of shareholders. Similarly, strong creditor rights should reduce risk shifting 
by speculating with derivatives. Moreover, easier access to derivatives might induce more speculative 
behavior. Utilizing our international sample, we find that the effect of derivatives usage on firm risk 
is negative independent of country-level corporate governance or access to derivatives. While the ex-
tent of risk reduction is not affected by shareholder rights, derivatives users in countries with weak 
creditor rights have significantly larger reductions in risk. These findings are consistent with lenders 
requiring firms to commit to an effective risk management policy when granting a loan in countries 
where creditor rights are weak. 
Finally, the reduction in risk is larger for firms in countries where derivatives are readily avail-
able, which is also in line with hedging motives for derivatives use. The finding that supply-side con-
straints are an important determinant of derivatives use is particularly relevant given recent policy 
debates surrounding financial risk and derivatives use (Stulz, 2004). The results for country-level 
measures of corporate governance complement recent findings by Géczy, Minton, and Schrand (2007) 
that U.S. nonfinancial firms with weaker firm-level corporate governance are more likely to indicate, 
in the Wharton survey of derivatives usage, that they take a view with derivatives, while these firms 
also have more extensive and sophisticated internal controls and monitoring mechanisms specifically 
related to derivatives activities. At the same time, the existing literature has shown that country-level 
governance is much more important generally (Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2007) and with regard to 
derivatives usage in particular (Allayannis, Lel and Miller, 2012). 
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Overall, this study provides new and comprehensive evidence regarding the effect of deriva-
tives usage by nonfinancial firms around the world on firm risk. Our results suggest that users of 
derivatives haver lower risk and often lower exposure to financial risks. The low relevance of specu-
lative aspects of hedging may explain why firms are willing to admit in questionnaires that they occa-
sionally take positions with derivatives or adjust the size and timing of their derivatives position de-
pending on their market view. While the lack of evidence of widespread gambling with derivatives by 
nonfinancial corporations is reassuring, the finding that corporate governance and access to financial 
derivatives affect the extent of risk reduction bears important implications, since these dimensions can 
be affected by policy decisions. Derivatives are very important financial tools for end-users such as 
nonfinancial firms, as they allow them to manage their risks effectively, especially using tailored deriv-
atives in the OTC market; as a result, these derivatives can enable such firms to grow more and to 
create more jobs (Stulz, 2009). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops the hypotheses as well 
as describes the methodology and data. The empirical results are presented in Section 3, while Section 
4 presents alternative specifications and robustness checks. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
2 Hypotheses, Methodology and Data 
2.1 Risk Taking and Determinants of Derivatives Usage 
Nonfinancial firms face a range of risks in the course of their business activities, such as changes in 
production technology, shifts in consumer demand, increases in raw material prices, the resignation 
of key executives, a fire in the warehouse, etc. While many of these risks can be hedged and thus 
transferred to other market participants, in the extreme this would turn the firm into a Treasury bond 
yielding the risk-free rate. However, investors can already buy Treasury bonds in the market, and they 
invest in the equities of nonfinancial firms because they seek higher returns for higher risk. In order 
for firms to determine which risks they should take (and which not), they need to understand their 
competitive advantage, which results from comparative advantages in terms of technology, efficiency 
and effectiveness of production, cost structures, etc. Firms should consider taking those risks where 
they have a comparative advantage in accordance with their risk management policy, capital structure 
and general financial health (Stulz, 1996). 
Nonfinancial firms typically have a competitive advantage with regards to taking risks on the 
real side of their business. For example, they might have an edge at manufacturing particular goods, 
predicting trends in technology or consumer demand, or developing or adapting to new raw materials 
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and production inputs. Their competitive advantage allows them to take these operating risks better 
than other firms, thus creating value for shareholders. In contrast, nonfinancial firms typically do not 
have a competitive advantage at predicting pure financial risks such as exchange rates or interest rates. 
As a result, it is economically sensible for nonfinancial firms to hedge their exposure to financial risks, 
if the cash flow variability arising from these risks could entail costs for the firm. To this end, the 
decision by many multinationals to currently no longer hedge FX risk reflects them taking a view on 
the volatility and direction of exchange rates, assuming that rates will remain in a limited range given 
that exchange rate volatility has plunged to its lowest levels in two decades with uniform near-zero 
interest rates since the recent financial crisis (Economist, 2014). Since hedging means to eliminate an 
exposure, selective or partial hedging (which reduces exposures but does not eliminate all of them) 
also amounts to speculation, because an exposure is retained based on a particular view about the 
underlying risk. Whether nonfinancial firms should hedge commodity price risk is less clear cut and 
will depend on how closely it is related to the core business of the firm and whether it extends to the 
competitive advantage of the firm or not. To illustrate, gold mining firms will have detailed insights 
into the factors determining the price of gold, and as a result some firms retain the gold price risk, 
while others use derivatives to hedge (part of) it. 
In principle, corporate hedging by nonfinancial corporations can increase shareholder value 
due to capital market imperfections. For example, corporate hedging can increase shareholder value 
by lowering the likelihood of bankruptcy and thus the expected cost of financial distress (Smith and 
Stulz, 1985; Stulz, 1996). A lower probability of financial distress will also increase the optimal debt-
equity ratio and therefore the associated tax shield of debt (Myers, 1984, 1993; Leland, 1998). In ad-
dition, if firms face a convex tax schedule, lower volatility of taxable income will result in lower ex-
pected tax payments (Smith and Stulz, 1985). 
Hedging at the firm level can also increase firm value by aligning corporate investment and 
financing policies (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993). Capital market imperfections cause the mar-
ginal cost of external financing to be increasing – for debt as well as for equity capital. When raising 
external capital is costly, e.g., because of transaction costs or conflicts of interest between shareholders 
and debtholders, firms may underinvest. Consequently, a shortage of internal funds for investment 
projects results in either a higher cost of capital or foregone profitable investment opportunities. Cor-
porate risk management, however, can help coordinate investment and financing policies and thus 
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harmonize the need for and availability of funds and avoid underinvestment and asset substitution 
problems. 
Finally, managers tend to have highly undiversified financial positions that are closely tied to 
their employer. As a result, risk-averse managers might be inclined to reduce the firm’s risk character-
istics to levels conflicting with shareholder value maximization or, alternatively, to demand higher 
compensation for being exposed to high business risk (Mayers and Smith 1990; Stulz 1990, 1984). 
Hedging at the firm level can mitigate these conflicts of interest by linking management compensation 
appropriately to the stock price of the firm (Han, 1996; Campbell and Kracaw, 1987; Smith and Stulz, 
1985). Firms will be more likely to hedge if they are closely held or have multiple share classes, but 
not if they have a stock option plan. 
These theories of corporate derivatives usage can be tested by regressing derivatives usage on 
firm characteristics in a probit model. The empirical hypotheses that have been derived in the literature 
from these theories are that firms with higher distress costs (e.g. higher leverage, lower coverage, lower 
quick ratio, lower size, lower profitability), with tax incentives to hedge (e.g. tax credits), more financial 
constraints (e.g. no dividend), more severe underinvestment problems (e.g. higher market/book, 
higher leverage), with management incentives to hedge (e.g. multiple share classes, no stock options), 
and with underlying gross exposure (e.g. foreign sales) are more likely to use derivatives.3 Thus: 
Hypothesis 1: Firms with higher distress costs, with tax incentives to hedge, more financial con-
straints, more severe underinvestment problems, with management incentives to hedge, and with un-
derlying gross exposure are more likely to hedge with derivatives. 
However, an important underlying assumption of such tests is that firms indeed use derivatives 
for hedging purposes, not for speculation. In case there are no real costs associated with a firm bearing 
foreign exchange, interest rate and commodity price risk, nonfinancial firms do not necessarily need 
to devote resources to reducing these risks if shareholders can eliminate them by holding diversified 
portfolios (Stulz, 1996). In particular, if companies have diversified shareholders and negative realiza-
tions of financial risks cannot cause a situation that affects their operations or interferes with their 
ability to carry out their strategic plan (e.g. because the financial exposures are limited and the firms 
have a significant equity base), a reasonable case could be made that firms should avoid hedging (Stulz, 
                                                 
3 See Aretz and Bartram (2010) for a review of this literature and the empirical evidence. 
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2013). In contrast, firms have strong reasons to hedge if they are closely held by owners who have a 
substantial fraction of their wealth in the firms’ equity and if losses due to financial risks could cause 
a difficult financial situation, force the firms to cancel planned investments, or require them to issue 
more equity. Nevertheless, unless they have private information, nonfinancial firms should not create 
or increase corporate exposure to financial risks with derivatives, since market efficiency would sug-
gest that corporate treasurers are unlikely to consistently make money by taking financial positions. 
Even in the case of specialized information, companies are more likely to hedge selectively than to 
take purely speculative derivatives positions (Stulz, 1996). As a result, to the extent that nonfinancial 
firms use derivatives, they should mostly employ them to reduce risk and financial exposures, but not 
to create positions with speculative motives.4 
While speculation with derivatives at the firm level may destroy firm value if it increases the 
expected costs of market imperfections, there are incentives for managers acting in the interest of 
shareholders to increase the riskiness of the firm in order to realize a wealth transfer from bondholders 
to shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977). Management compensation schemes, in 
particular stock options, may also reduce managerial risk aversion and create monetary incentives for 
managers to take gambles at the firm level, and managers with inferior management skill can use 
corporate speculation with derivatives to increase the noise associated with firm performance in order 
to hide their true ability (Breeden and Viswanathan, 1998). Whether firms use derivatives for hedging 
or speculation can be tested empirically, as detailed in the next section. 
2.2 Risk Measures and Derivatives Use 
The risk taking behavior of derivatives users can be studied by relating their use of derivatives to firm 
risk and exposures, in order to assess whether derivatives users have higher or lower risk and exposure 
compared to similar firms not using derivatives. To this end, three different categories of risk/expo-
sure are employed. First, firms may differ with regard to their gross or pre-hedging exposure. For 
instance, measures of gross exposure with regard to foreign exchange rate risk include foreign sales 
(relative to total sales), foreign income (relative to total income), and foreign assets (relative to total 
assets). In addition to these individual proxies of foreign exchange rate exposure, we follow the liter-
ature and create a variable Gross-FX-Exposure that is one if firms have non-zero values for any of these 
                                                 
4 See Rossi (2013) with regards to empirical classifications of hedgers, selective hedgers and speculators. Lin, Pantzalis and 
Park (2017) provide evidence consistent with the notion that prudent use of financial derivatives improves firms’ infor-
mation environment. 
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characteristics (and zero otherwise), in order to capture exposure from either source. Foreign debt 
may create an exposure as well, but it could also work as a hedge. Leverage, coverage or the quick 
ratio may be proxies for gross interest rate exposure.5 With regard to commodity price exposure, the 
variable Gross-CP-Exposure is assigned the value one for firms in the utilities, oil, mining, steel, and 
chemicals industries (and zero otherwise).6 If firms are using derivatives primarily for hedging pur-
poses, they should be observed to use derivatives if they have high measures of gross exposure. 
Hypothesis 2: Derivatives users have higher gross exposure than non-users. 
Second, firms in different countries face different levels of macroeconomic or country risk. 
To illustrate, firms operate in a more risky environment if incorporated in a country that is character-
ized by high volatility of interest rates (IR-Country) and exchange rates (FX-Country). A high ratio of 
(the natural logarithm of) exports and imports relative to the Gross Domestic Product (LogEXIM/ 
GDP) indicates a stronger dependence of a country on international trade and thus vulnerability to 
exchange rate risk. In contrast, larger economies (as measured by the logarithm of GDP) may provide 
a more stable operating environment. Aggregate measures of country risk are the International Coun-
try Risk indices that provide inverse rankings of countries’ financial risk (ICR-Financial), economic risk 
(ICR-Economic), political risk (ICR-Political), and overall country risk (ICR-Composite). It is expected that 
more firms use derivatives in countries with high risk if hedging is the motivation for the use of these 
instruments. 
Hypothesis 3: Derivatives users have higher macroeconomic or country risk than non-users. 
Third, a firm’s net (or post-hedging) risk and exposure is the result of the characteristics of its 
assets and liabilities, but also includes the effects of off-balance sheet transactions such as derivatives. 
While the different components and their interactions are difficult to decompose, the assumption of 
efficient capital markets suggests that net risk and exposures can be estimated empirically using a 
company’s stock price as an aggregate measure of all relevant information. Consequently, different 
corporate risk/exposure measures are constructed from stock returns during the observation year. In 
particular, the ratio of a firm’s stock return standard deviation to the standard deviation of the returns 
                                                 
5 Coverage might not be a very clean measure of gross exposure. We use the three-year average of coverage since any 
effects of interest rate derivatives on this variable should smooth out over the cycle. The exact nature of the exposure 
of firms to interest rate risk depends on whether their debt is fixed or floating rate. 
6 The commodity price exposure of firms depends on whether they have cost or revenue exposure, long-term contracts, 
commodity-price-linked debt, etc. Commodity-price-sensitive industries are identified based on input-output tables. 
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of the local market index (Std.Dev.) is a measure of the net risk of the firm.7 We standardize firm 
volatility using local market volatility to avoid a potential bias from a spurious correlation between 
derivatives use and market volatility. The sensitivity of the firm’s stock return to the local market 
return, as well as measures of exchange rate risk, interest rate risk and commodity price risk, is esti-
mated using the model 
jtCPtjIRtjFXtjMtjjjt RRRRR φεδχβα +++++= , (1) 
where Rjt is the stock return of firm j, RMt is the return on the local stock market index, RFXt is the 
return of the exchange rate index, RIRt is the percentage change in the short-term interest rate variable, 
and RCPt is the percentage change in the commodity price index (see the data section for details on 
these variables).8 The estimated coefficients from this model provide our primary measures of net 
exposures to financial risks. Specifically, market exposure is measured by jβˆ  (Beta), net foreign ex-
change rate exposure is measured by jχˆ  (Net-FX-Exposure), net interest rate exposure is measured by 
jδˆ  (Net-IR- Exposure), and net commodity price exposure is measured by jεˆ  (Net-CP- Exposure). Cor-
porate use of derivatives for hedging purposes would be consistent with lower or similar total risk and 
measures of post-hedging exposures as estimated in the regression framework. Since stock return 
volatility is a summary measure of the different financial risks, the effects are expected to be stronger 
compared to the net exposures, which may also suffer from measurement error.9 In contrast to return 
volatility as a measure of total risk, the net exposures only capture the part of total risk related to 
market, currency, interest rate and commodity price fluctuations. 
Hypothesis 4: Derivatives users have lower or similar net risk and exposure than non-users. 
To summarize, the empirical predictions are that, consistent with firms using derivatives for 
hedging purposes, users of derivatives have higher firm-level gross exposure to exchange rate, interest 
rate and commodity price risk, are located in countries with higher country risk, and have lower or 
similar levels of net risk and exposure. However, two caveats are in order. First, as mentioned earlier, 
                                                 
7 Alternative measures of total risk are earnings/cash flow volatility (see Beneda, 2013; Bartram, Brown and Conrad, 2011). 
8 In robustness tests, we also examine the sensitivity to long-term interest rates. 
9 The literature has provided ample evidence that net exposures to currency risk, interest rate risk and commodity price 
risk are hard to estimate with a lot of precision (but also documented that they are still economically meaningful). Results 
using weekly data are overall similar. 
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some nonfinancial firms might have a comparative advantage with regard to managing commodity 
price risk and thus might not hedge it. Consequently, while it would still seem more likely that firms 
use commodity price derivatives for partial/selective hedging rather than taking new positions (Gold-
stein, Li and Yang, 2014), it is less clear whether this results in lower risk and exposures compared to 
non-users of CP derivatives. Second, if firms are far away from financial distress and other capital 
market imperfections do not cause real costs, firms might opt not to hedge financial risks even if they 
have no private information. However, it is not clear that such behavior, if present during the sample 
period, would bias this analysis in a particular way. 
Additional firm characteristics, as suggested by the prior literature and economic intuition, are 
included in the multivariate analysis as important control variables.10 In particular, firm risk is expected 
to be negatively related to industrial diversification (number of industry segments) and firm size (nat-
ural logarithm of total assets or alternatively the sum of equity market capitalization, total debt, and 
preferred stock). In contrast, firms with more growth options, as measured by the book-to-market 
ratio, research and development expenses (relative to sales) and capital expenditures (relative to total 
sales) are expected to exhibit higher risk. Beyond these firm characteristics, factors at the country level 
might have an effect on the relation between derivatives usage and firm risk, which is explored in the 
next section. 
2.3 Corporate Governance and Derivatives Market Access 
The broad coverage of countries by our sample provides several benefits. First, the large number of 
companies compared to prior studies provides statistical power. Second, the limited analysis of deriv-
atives usage internationally allows us to effectively conduct out-of-sample tests of prior results. Third, 
influential policy makers have suggested that access to derivatives can enhance macroeconomic devel-
opment. For example, the former U.S. Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan remarked 
in a speech “The further development of derivatives markets, particularly in smaller economies where idiosyncratic risk 
may be more difficult to hedge, will likely facilitate greater cross-border flows and a more productive distribution of global 
savings.”11 Thus, it is important to determine which country-specific factors, if any, moderate the extent 
                                                 
10 To illustrate, Hentschel and Kothari (2001) use firm size, leverage and the market-to-book ratio as control variables in 
regressions of the stock return volatility of U.S. firms on derivatives usage. 
11 Comments made at the Banque de France International Symposium on Monetary Policy, Economic Cycle, and Financial 
Dynamics, Paris, France, March 7, 2003. 
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to which firms use derivatives for hedging or speculation, especially if these factors can be influenced 
by policy. 
To this end, Allayannis, Lel and Miller (2012) and Lel (2012) suggest that corporate governance 
may be important for the motivations of firms with ADRs to use currency derivatives in order to 
increase their firm value. Stronger investor protection entails lower agency costs, and shareholders 
can, for instance, easily replace managers as a result of weak firm performance. We focus our analysis 
on measures of the strength of country-level governance, since country characteristics explain much 
more of the variance in governance ratings than observable firm characteristics (Doidge, Karolyi and 
Stulz, 2007). Moreover, they have been shown to matter most for the effect of derivatives use on firm 
value, because weak firm-level corporate governance can be mitigated by strong country-level govern-
ance (Allayannis et al., 2012). 
Consequently, it could be argued that firms that operate in an environment with strong share-
holder rights are less likely to use derivatives for speculative purposes due to well-protected rights of 
minority shareholders and effective monitoring (La Porta et al., 1998). If nonfinancial firms have no 
competitive advantage at predicting exchange rates and interest rates, it will typically be in the interest 
of shareholders to hedge these risks in the presence of capital market imperfections. However, man-
agers have incentives to use the firm’s resources to pursue their own interests as opposed to maxim-
izing shareholder value. To illustrate, managers might use derivatives to avoid being replaced due to 
negative effects of financial risks on firm performance (Breeden and Viswanathan, 1996), to gamble 
for resurrection, or to insure their personal wealth. Executive compensation schemes with nonlinear 
payoffs might incentivize managers to take higher levels of risk, and managers with inferior ability 
have incentives to increase the noise associated with firm performance in order to hide their true skills 
(Breeden and Viswanathan, 1998; DeMarzo and Duffie, 1995). As a result, managers may use their 
discretion to employ derivatives for speculative purposes such as bets on both the direction and future 
volatility of the underlying asset, possibly even under the guise of hedging. Nevertheless, strong in-
vestor protection rights entail more effective monitoring, which should reduce these agency costs and 
the private benefits consumed by managers (La Porta et al., 2000, 2002).12 
                                                 
12 This hypothesis is in the same spirit to hypotheses on role of shareholder protection for the effect of corporate deriva-
tives usage or cash holdings on firm value (Allayannis et al., 2012; Pinkowitz et al., 2006; Kalcheva and Lins, 2007). 
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Thus, the empirical prediction is that firms in countries with strong shareholder rights will 
reduce risk more, compared to otherwise similar firms in countries with weak shareholder rights. Note 
though that, even in countries with strong shareholder rights, managers acting in the best interests of 
shareholders may have an incentive not to hedge if hedging primarily benefits bondholders at the 
expense of shareholders. Our proxy for the strength of shareholder rights is the Anti-Self-Dealing 
Index (from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2008). 
Hypothesis 5: Firms in countries with strong shareholder rights reduce risk more, compared to oth-
erwise similar firms in countries with weak shareholder rights. 
Second, consistent with La Porta et al. (1998), one might also expect firms to use derivatives 
for hedging rather than speculation in the presence of strong creditor rights where the legal system is 
more efficient and contracts can be enforced (Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard, 2001). Creditors are 
concerned about the risk of the firm and losses, e.g. due to unexpected changes in exchange rates, 
interest rates or commodity prices, that lead to a wealth transfer to shareholders and may cause the 
firm to default on its interest and capital repayment obligations. Therefore, they have a preference for 
a risk management policy that reduces risk, i.e. hedging, and firms will use derivatives to reduce risk 
more in countries where creditors can more easily exercise their powers against management (La Porta 
et al., 2000). 
In fact it could be argued that strong bondholder rights could lead to overly conserva-
tive/costly risk management, while strong shareholder rights would lead, on the margin, to less and 
closer to optimal degrees of hedging. Moreover, bankruptcy costs are expected to be large in countries 
with strong creditor rights (Smith and Stulz, 1985). As a result, the empirical prediction is that firms 
in countries with strong creditor rights reduce risk more than similar firms in countries with weak 
creditor rights. Alternatively, lenders in countries with weak creditor rights might require firms to 
credibly commit to an effective risk management policy before providing funds. To this end, we ex-
amine the relation between derivatives use and firm risk/exposure, conditional on the strength of 
Creditor Rights (from La Porta et al., 1998).13 
Hypothesis 6: Firms in countries with strong creditor rights reduce risk more than similar firms in 
countries with weak creditor rights. 
                                                 
13 Results using the creditor rights index by Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007) are similar. 
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Third, firms located in economies with more developed and liquid derivatives markets have 
better access to derivatives that can affect the likelihood and purpose of firms using these instruments. 
If it is difficult to take positions in derivatives, firms might not go through the trouble to do so unless 
they have a serious hedging need, and to the extent that they have the objective to speculate, they 
might seek gambles elsewhere. In contrast, easy access to derivatives may facilitate engaging in deriv-
atives transactions for purposes other than hedging because the costs of entering transactions (or more 
generally, markets) are lower and therefore less likely to require extraordinary actions on the part of 
managers. Thus, the empirical prediction would be that firms in countries with easier access to deriv-
atives markets reduce risk less than firms in countries with difficult market access. On the other hand, 
easier access to derivatives markets entails that firms are able to set up hedging strategies more effi-
ciently and at a lower cost, which may lead to risk reduction. As a proxy for access to derivatives 
markets we use the Derivatives Market Rank, which quantifies the size of the local-currency derivatives 
market relative to the size of the economy (from Bartram, Brown and Fehle, 2009). 
Hypothesis 7: Firms in countries with easier access to derivatives markets reduce risk less than firms 
in countries with difficult market access. 
To summarize, the empirical predictions are that firms in countries with strong shareholder 
rights, strong creditor rights and more difficult access to derivatives reduce risk more than otherwise 
similar firms (with likely weaker results for commodity price exposures). Thus, corporate governance 
and derivatives market access are dimensions by which the use of derivatives may vary across coun-
tries, even if firms in all countries were using derivatives for hedging purposes, i.e. firms may vary in 
the degree to which they reduce risk (i.e. hedge or selectively hedge), or in the extreme increase risk, 
with derivatives. 
2.4 Sample and Data Sources 
The markets for over-the-counter instruments and exchange-traded derivative financial instruments 
on foreign exchange rates, interest rates and commodity prices have exhibited exponential growth 
over the past 30 years (see Figure 1). As a result, notional amounts outstanding for OTC derivatives 
exceeded $650 trillion in 2013, with interest rate derivatives accounting for about 85% of the total 
(Table 1). Along with increased use, regulation for the disclosure of derivatives has developed, requir-
ing firms in many countries to include information about their derivatives positions in their annual 
reports. In particular, firms in the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand, as well as firms complying with International Accounting Standards (IAS), are required to 
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disclose information on their derivatives positions; many other firms do so voluntarily.14 The resulting 
availability of data makes the empirical analysis of the use of derivatives by nonfinancial firms in dif-
ferent countries possible. 
The sample in this study comprises 6,896 nonfinancial firms from 47 countries including the 
United States. It consists of all firms that have accounting data for either the year 2000 or 2001 on the 
Thomson Analytics database, that have an annual report in English for the same year on the Global 
Reports database, that are not part of the financial sector (banking, insurance, etc.), and that have at 
least 36 non-missing daily stock returns on Datastream during the year of the annual report.15 The 47 
countries represent 99% of global market capitalization in 2000 and 2001, and the firms in the sample 
account for 60.6% of overall global market capitalization or 76.8% of global market capitalization of 
nonfinancial firms.16 Firms are classified as users or non-users of derivatives based on a search of their 
annual reports for information about the use of derivatives. In addition to the systematically and con-
sistently collected categorical data on derivatives (Derivatives), information on the underlying (i.e., for-
eign exchange, interest rates, or commodity price) is collected (FX-Derivatives, IR-Derivatives, CP-Deriv-
atives). Given the difficulty of data collection for a large international sample and of determining the 
correct size and sign of derivatives positions generally (due to different underlyings, maturities, 
long/short positions etc.), we only use categorical data on derivatives usage throughout the paper. 
Dichotomous variables for the use of foreign currency debt (to capture money market hedges) (Foreign 
Debt) and stock options (Stock Options) are created in the same fashion, since this information is not 
readily available elsewhere. Compared to questionnaires, archival data might be more reliable since 
they are sourced from audited financial statements, and the analysis of stock market data should reflect 
all sources of exposure and hedging. 
                                                 
14 For example, the following are recent standards (and effective dates) adopted by so-called G4+1 countries and the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) as part of the movement toward common reporting standards: United 
States, FAS 133 (effective June 15, 1999); United Kingdom, FRS 13 (effective March 23, 1999); Australia, AAS 33 (ef-
fective January 1, 2000); Canada, AcSB Handbook Section 3860 (Financial Instruments – Disclosure and Presentation, 
effective January 1, 1996); New Zealand, FRS-31 (effective December 31, 1993); IASB, IAS 32 (March 1995, modified 
March 1998 to reflect issuance of IAS 39, effective January 1, 2001). 
15 Global Reports (www.global-reports.com) is an online information provider of public company documents in full-color, 
portable document format (PDF). While we do not impose a liquidity filter, we find similar results when excluding stocks 
with less than 30% non-zero returns. See Crosby (2014) with regards to optimal hedging of variance derivatives. 
16 Since the data cover two years, these values are calculated as the sum of each firm’s percentage of global market capital-
ization for the year it appears. 
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All capital market data (i.e. the firms’ stock return indices, stock market return indices, interest 
rates, exchange rate indices and commodity price indices) are from Datastream. These data are pro-
vided at the daily frequency. For each firm, we calculate stock returns in local currency, local currency 
returns of the corresponding Datastream value-weighted national stock market index, the percentage 
change in the Bank of England currency index (in local currency relative to the basket of foreign 
currencies), the percentage change in the Eurocurrency interest rate, the percentage change in the yield 
of the Datastream benchmark bond, and the percentage change in the Goldman Sachs Commodity 
Index. All time-series are limited to the year of the firm’s annual report. 
Accounting data originate from the Thomson Analytics database.17 Outliers are eliminated by 
winzorizing observations in the top and bottom one percentile as well as those exceeding more than 
five standard deviations from the median. This filter eliminates some apparent data errors where the 
magnitudes suggest data units are not properly reported (e.g., thousands instead of millions). System-
atic differences across countries and industries are controlled for by country, industry and year fixed 
effects in the regressions (where possible), or by regressing accounting variables on country, industry 
and year indicator variables and analyzing the residuals from this regression. In order to avoid the 
results being influenced by the effect of the economic cycle, we use three-year averages of variables 
where this impact seems most relevant (e.g. coverage, foreign income). The definitions of all variables 
are presented in Table A-1 in the Appendix. 
3 Empirical Results 
3.1 Derivatives Use and Risk Measures 
Summary statistics on the use of derivatives by the sample firms is presented in Table A-2. Panel A 
shows aggregate statistics by country. Across all countries, 60.5% of the firms in the sample use at 
least one type of derivative. FX derivatives are the most common (45.5%), followed by interest rate 
derivatives (33.1%) and commodity price derivatives (9.8%). While there is variation across countries, 
the statistics show that derivatives usage is very common across geographic areas, and more the rule 
than the exception. Derivatives usage is more frequent in developed countries compared to non-
OECD countries, as well as slightly more popular in non-U.S. countries compared to the United 
                                                 
17 Data are commonly reported in millions of U.S. dollars. Many of the variables we examine are ratios and are therefore 
largely comparable across countries and years. However, we also include an indicator variable for the year (2000 or 2001) 
in our multivariate analysis and have undertaken robustness checks for all parts of the analysis to make sure that our 
results are not driven by the year we examine. 
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States. Panel B shows statistics on derivatives usage by industry, and also distinguishes between dif-
ferent types of instruments. More than three-quarters of the firms use derivatives in the industries 
Machinery, Fabr. Products, Automobiles, Utilities, Tobacco Products, Aircraft, and Defense. Across 
different types of underlyings, the heaviest users of FX products are firms in Machinery, Automobiles, 
Aircraft and Tobacco Products. In contrast, interest rate derivatives are most frequently used in the 
industries Aircraft, Utilities and Tobacco Products. The use of commodity price derivatives is more 
limited and concentrated among firms in Utilities, Precious Metals and Oil. 
In order to study the relation between the risk characteristics of the sample firms and their use 
of derivatives, we conduct nonparametric Wilcoxon tests. Table 2 reports the p-values of these tests 
together with the means, medians and standard deviations of firm characteristics for derivatives users 
and non-users. While the results in Table 2 only refer to general derivatives use, the tests are also 
conducted for foreign exchange rate derivatives, interest rate derivatives and commodity price deriv-
atives, and differences are mentioned where appropriate. Table 2 shows some initial evidence that 
firms use derivatives in line with hedging considerations. In particular, users of derivatives have sig-
nificantly more Gross-FX-Exposure, i.e. firms using derivatives are more exposed to exchange rate risk 
before considering hedging (i.e., pre-hedging or gross exposure). In fact all three dimensions of foreign 
business, i.e. foreign sales, income and assets, are larger for derivatives users. This is what one would 
expect to see if firms were using derivatives for hedging purposes. The liabilities of derivatives users 
are also significantly more exposed to exchange rate risk, since they are more likely to have foreign 
currency debt. Moreover, derivatives users have significantly higher leverage, and they are more likely 
to belong to commodity-based industries. Overall, the results suggest that firms are more likely to use 
derivatives if they have higher gross exposure, which is in line with hypothesis 2, and the results are 
robust to the type of underlying risk (exchange rate risk, interest rate risk or commodity price risk). 
In addition to the business and financial risk of the firm, risks outside the company, such as 
country risk, may impact a firm’s propensity to use derivatives for hedging or speculative purposes. 
To this end, the univariate evidence for hypothsis 3 in Table 2 is mixed. The results suggest that firms 
in countries with higher foreign exchange rate risk and higher financial risk use derivatives more fre-
quently, which is consistent with hedging motives. On the other hand, there is also evidence that more 
firms use derivatives in countries with low interest rate risk, lower trade, lower aggregate country risk 
(economic risk or political risk) and larger GDP. 
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The fact that asset, liability, and country risk are not independent suggests looking at more 
comprehensive risk and exposure measures based on firms’ stock returns, as well as employing a mul-
tivariate analysis (presented subsequently). Stock prices represent an aggregate measure of asset and 
liability risk and should also incorporate the effects of financial risk management. If derivatives are 
used for hedging purposes, derivatives users might show lower or similar post-hedging (net) risk com-
pared to otherwise similar non-users. Table 2 reports that derivatives users exhibit significantly lower 
absolute levels of net risk and exposure. This is true for all measures (Std.Dev., Beta, Net-FX-Exposure, 
Net-IR-Exposure, and Net-CP-Exposure). The magnitudes of the differences are substantial. For exam-
ple, the median Std.Dev. is 20.8% lower for derivatives users than for non-users, while median market 
betas are 13.4% smaller. Similar differences exist for Net-FX-Exposure, Net-IR-Exposure, and Net-CP-
Exposure. This evidence is suggestive of firms using derivative instruments for hedging purposes and 
thus exhibiting lower measures of net financial risk, in support of hypothesis 4. 
Similar results are obtained for most of the firm-specific variables after each variable has been 
adjusted for country and industry fixed-effects, except that derivatives users now have slightly higher 
average (but not median) market betas. Overall, these univariate results suggest that nonfinancial firms 
use derivatives in line with hedging motives. Given the relatively modest leverage ratios of the sample 
firms, the incremental benefits accruing from the additional risk of derivatives speculation may be 
small, since the equity position as an option on the assets of the firm is relatively deep in the money 
(Hentschel and Kothari, 2001). 
3.2 Determinants of Derivatives Use 
An important caveat to the results in Table 2 is that derivatives users also differ by other firm charac-
teristics that have been related to lower financial risk in other studies. As outlined in Section 2.1, 
various theories suggest that firms may be able to enhance shareholder value by hedging at the firm 
level in the presence of capital market imperfections. They can be tested using corporate derivatives 
usage as an indicator for corporate hedging and relating it as a dependent variable in a probit regression 
to various firm characteristics. Table 3 shows results from such regressions for the full sample, as well 
as the six countries with the most observations (the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Ger-
many, Canada, and Australia) and all other countries, based on general derivatives use. 
For all countries (first column), sufficient data are available for 6,220 firms. The financial dis-
tress and tax hypotheses are supported by the positive coefficients for leverage and the income tax 
credit variable, as well as the negative coefficient for the quick ratio. However, the positive coefficients 
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for size and profit margin are contrary to predictions. The full sample also provides mixed support 
for the underinvestment theory. Contrary to the prediction, the coefficient for the market-to-book 
ratio is negative, yet the coefficient for the interaction between market-to-book and leverage is posi-
tive. There also exists mixed support for the managerial incentives hypothesis – both the presence of 
stock options and multiple share classes are positively related to derivatives use. It is possible that 
these results might both support the managerial incentives hypothesis if managers on average hold 
very in-the-money options and are thus using derivatives to preserve the value of their equity-like 
positions. 
We include several variables in the analysis as controls. For example, we condition our analysis 
on the unobserved levels of exposure. For IR exposure, leverage is our proxy (and is already included 
in the analysis). To identify firms more likely to use derivatives because of significant currency expo-
sure, we include our FX exposure variable, which is, as predicted, positively related to derivatives use. 
We include a foreign debt variable separately, because it may be an FX hedging tool that is a comple-
ment to derivatives, a source of exposure (e.g., for firms in developing countries), or an FX hedging 
tool that substitutes for derivatives (e.g., for U.S. firms). The first two explanations suggest a positive 
relation between foreign debt and derivatives use, and the last suggests a negative relation. The esti-
mated positive coefficient is consistent with foreign debt either acting as a complement to derivatives 
or creating an FX exposure on average. 
An important contribution of this study is to compare derivatives use across many countries 
using consistent and fully comparable data. The remaining columns in Table 3 show that the results 
discussed above differ very little across countries. In fact, for all but two cases where a variable is 
significant for the full sample, the sign of significant coefficients for individual countries is the same 
(the quick ratio in Australia has a positive coefficient and MB*Leverage has a negative sign in Japan). 
Overall, these results are important since they indicate that factors determining derivatives usage are 
surprisingly common across different countries. We also note the apparent increase in statistical power 
gained from examining firms across many countries. Coefficients that are of the same sign in most 
subsamples but only statistically significant in a few countries are statistically significant in the full 
sample. 
The fact that the results are strong and consistent suggests that none of the examined primary 
theories in hypothesis 1 is unequivocally supported by the data. Consequently, it may be that other 
motivations that are not well motivated by existing risk management theory and that are difficult to 
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examine empirically provide a better explanation of the results, such as earnings management, com-
petitive factors in firms’ industries, and speculation (Mello, Parsons and Triantis, 1995; Brown, 2001; 
Core, Guay and Kothari, 2002). In the rest of the paper, we investigate the possibility of corporate 
speculation with derivatives as one such alternative explanation. Alternatively, it may simply be that 
derivatives are financial tools that firms integrate into their financial operations once they obtain a 
certain level of sophistication. 
3.3 Hedging and Speculation with Derivatives 
In order to investigate to what extent firms use derivatives for speculation, we follow the literature on 
U.S. firms (see e.g. Hentschel and Kothari, 2001) and estimate regressions that relate corporate risk 
and absolute values of exposure measures as alternative dependent variables to derivatives use while 
controlling for the level of gross exposure and other firm characteristics. In particular, the regressions 
use Gross-FX-Exposure, Leverage and industry fixed effects to capture gross exposure to currency, inter-
est rate and commodity price risk. The regressions further control for a set of country risk variables 
selected from a range of available proxies (such as the ICR composite index and its subindices, coun-
try-level measures of interest rate and exchange rate risk, etc.) covering different aspects of country 
risk. Specifically, the (natural logarithm of the) ratio of exports and imports to GDP is used as a proxy 
for country-level exchange rate risk, the standard deviation of the short-term interest rate is used as a 
proxy for interest rate risk, and the ICR index is used to capture political risk.18 These variables model 
country risk characteristics more explicitly and control for differences in the environment that firms 
are operating in (without suggesting that firms will or can hedge these dimensions). The Newey-West 
(1987) procedure is used to correct the standard errors for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. 
Table 4 shows detailed results using general derivatives in Panel A, while Panel B is based on 
the same regression specifications but with FX, IR and CP derivatives, respectively, and displays only 
the coefficient on the derivatives variable. The results corroborate the prior univariate finding that 
derivatives users have significantly lower stock return volatility than non-users, consistent with hy-
pothesis 4. In particular, the OLS coefficient of general derivatives use in Panel A is large (-0.112) and 
                                                 
18 ICR Political is a commonly used proxy for country risk. The literature suggests that country risk could increase system-
atic risk and decreases the rewards of risk taking at the firm level, so that firms take fewer diversifiable risks in riskier 
countries. Alternatively, country risk could lead to more firm-specific shocks that firms cannot mitigate, thereby increas-
ing idiosyncratic risk. Empirical evidence suggests that firms in countries with more political risk have more systematic 
risk, while the relation between political risk and idiosyncratic risk is ambiguous (Bartram, Brown and Stulz, 2012). 
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highly significant (p-value < 0.01). Several of the control variables are also significant and of the pre-
dicted sign. Firms have higher stock return standard deviations if they are small, have foreign debt, 
few industry segments and do not pay dividends, while gross FX exposure, leverage, and the book-to-
market ratio are insignificant.19 
Beyond total risk as measured by stock return volatility, it is interesting to examine the effect 
of derivatives on some of the underlying risk factors. Given that the regression only measures selected 
risk exposures, their effects do not necessarily have to align with the effect on overall volatility. With 
regards to systematic market risk, firms that use derivatives also have significantly lower market betas. 
Betas are lower by -0.072 (p-value < 0.01). Firms have systematically higher market betas if they are 
large, have high book-to-market ratios, have low leverage, and do not pay dividends. The relations 
between derivatives use and Net-FX-Exposure, Net-IR-Exposure and Net-CP-Exposure are also negative, 
and significant for exposures to currency and commodity price risk. Several control variables are im-
portant, such as international trade for foreign exchange rate exposure and interest rate risk for interest 
rate exposure, while the firm-level measures of these gross exposures (Gross-FX-Exposure, Leverage) are 
not significant. The coefficients of the aggregate measure of country political risk suggest that higher 
country risk is associated with higher market and currency exposures, but lower interest rate exposure. 
The economic magnitude of these effects is relatively small. 
A potential concern of this analysis the possible endogeneity of derivatives use.20 In particular, 
the observed measures of firm risk may not only be a function of derivatives use, but they may also 
determine the decision of a firm to use derivatives at the same time. Hentschel and Kothari (2001) 
discuss the inherent difficulty of controlling for endogeneity issues for derivatives usage, but argue 
that a net negative bias in the estimates of the coefficients on derivatives is unlikely, and the results of 
their instrumental variables approach are similar to their main results. Guay (1999) controls for en-
dogeneity by analyzing U.S. firms that initiate the use of derivatives and find a slight reduction in the 
risk. Bartram, Brown and Conrad (2011) provide evidence from propensity score matching showing 
that the risk effects of derivatives are not very sensitive to potential endogeneity and omitted variable 
problems. 
                                                 
19 The negative sign on firm size is also consistent with prior evidence by Christie (1982) and Hentschel and Kothari 
(2001); the latter find a statistically significant but economically small positive relation between the size of a firm’s deriva-
tives position and stock return volatility. 
20 See also Chen (2011), Chen and King (2014). 
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In order to mitigate potential concerns about derivatives usage and firm risk being endoge-
nously determined and driven by similar variables, Table 4 also reports results from an instrumental 
variables approach. We instrument the use of derivatives with variables that are likely to affect deriv-
atives use but not firm risk. Following the literature, our instruments include a variable indicating the 
percent of firms in the same country and industry that use derivatives (Allayannis, Lel and Miller, 
2012) and a dummy indicating income tax credits e.g. due to tax loss carry forwards (Chen and King, 
2014). We expect positive correlations between these variables and derivatives usage and find con-
firming evidence since all of these variables are positively associated with the decision to use deriva-
tives. We validate our instruments via several specification tests. As reported in the table, we can reject 
the hypotheses of underidentification and weak identification (Stock and Yogo), confirming that our 
instruments are strongly related to the endogenous variable of derivatives use. The Sargan overidenti-
fication tests have p-values between 0.31 and 0.80, and therefore fail to reject the null hypotheses that 
the instruments are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded 
instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated second-stage regressions. The results from the 
instrumental variables regressions confirm that derivatives use is negatively associated with firm risk 
and exposure with the exception of commodity price exposure, which has a negative but insignificant 
coefficient. 
We also estimate a treatment effects model in order to address potential concerns that firms 
that use derivatives may self-select. The treatment effects methodology models the decision to use 
derivatives using variables that have previously been shown to be important, such as size, leverage, 
profitability, dividends (see Table 3), and controls for the associated selection effect in the second 
stage. Similar to the main results, estimations that control for self-selection show a negative and sig-
nificant relation between derivatives usage and firm risk and exposure.21 
Panel B of Table 4 provides additional insights into the relations between financial risk and 
exposure measures and the types of derivatives that firms use. Analyzing derivatives with different 
underlyings is interesting given the differences in motivations of nonfinancial firms to use them. Non-
financial firms typically do not have a competitive advantage at predicting currencies and interest rates 
and thus should hedge these financial exposures. In contrast, commodity prices are potentially closely 
                                                 
21 For further robustness tests regarding endogeneity see Section 4. 
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related to the operating business of nonfinancial firms, suggesting that firms might have sound eco-
nomic rationales to take or retain commodity prices exposures. Moreover, evidence of derivatives 
speculation from questionnaires pertains generally to currency and interest rate derivatives, and there 
is academic (Chernenko and Faulkender, 2011; Faulkender, 2005) and anecdotal (Economist, 2014) 
evidence of speculation with FX and IR derivatives. At the same time, identifying the use of derivatives 
on particular underlyings is more difficult. 
Consistent with the hedging hypothesis 4, FX-Derivatives have the largest negative effect on 
Net-FX-Exposure though there is also a significant negative effect on Beta and Net-CP-Exposure. IR-
Derivatives use is significantly negatively related to Std.Dev., Beta, Net-FX-Exposure and Net-CP-Expo-
sure. The effect on Net-IR-Exposure is insignificant, providing no evidence of speculation with interest 
rate derivatives. Finally, CP-Derivatives use leads to lower Std.Dev. and Beta despite being associated 
with significantly higher Net-CP-Exposure. This might be due to the fact that commodity price risk is 
likely related to the competitive advantage of the firms using CP-Derivatives and thus part of the risk 
that these firms want to take. Nevertheless, these higher CP exposures may be too small to result in 
higher total risk for derivatives users, ceteris paribus. 
Panel B of Table 4 also show results for the instrumental variables model. All coefficients on 
all types of derivatives have negative coefficients, and they are significant for total risk, beta and Net-
FX-Exposure and Net-IR-Exposure. While the derivatives coefficients are negative for Net-CP-Exposure 
as well, they are not statistically different from zero. Thus, even after controlling for endogeneity with 
instrumental variables there is no evidence of corporate speculation with derivatives. The panel also 
reports results from the treatment effects model. Here, the relation between FX and IR derivatives 
and firm risk and exposure is significantly negative for all measures. In contrast, while the relation of 
CP derivatives with Std.Dev., Net-FX-Exposure and Net-IR-Exposure is insignificant, it is significantly 
negative for beta, but significantly positive for Net-CP-Exposure. Thus, results that control for self-
selection confirm the prior results of firms using derivatives to reduce risk and exposures, except for 
commodity price risk which is closely related to the competitive advantage of non-financial firms and 
thus may be economically sensible for them to bear. 
In order to better understand the use of derivatives internationally, we also conduct the anal-
ysis individually for the six countries with the most observations (as well as all other countries together) 
and run regressions for each subsample for each of the five risk/exposure measures we examine as 
alternative dependent variable. For brevity, Table 5 only displays the coefficient and p-value of the 
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derivatives variable. As would be expected with few observations, the statistical significance of the 
results is lower but the vast majority of estimated coefficients for the derivatives use variable are neg-
ative, and importantly, they are always negative when significant. There are a number of cases where 
the coefficients are insignificant, indicating that there is no difference in risk or exposure between 
users and non-users of derivatives. However, there are no instances where derivatives use is associated 
with significantly higher measures of financial risk or exposure, i.e. there is no evidence of speculation 
with derivatives anywhere in the world, which is in line with hypothesis 4. Thus, the results show a 
remarkable consistency in the effect of derivatives use on risk and exposure of firms across countries. 
While prior evidence has either been for U.S. samples or aggregate global samples, Table 5 provides 
both new evidence for U.S. firms in the light of conflicting evidence of previous studies, as well as 
first international evidence for a range of individual countries. The by-country results also show that 
the full sample results in Table 4 are not just driven by the large fraction of U.S. firms in the sample, 
but exist in similar fashion in other countries. 
On the whole, these findings provide further support for the hypothesis that nonfinancial 
firms use financial derivatives for hedging purposes even after controlling for gross exposure at the 
firm and country level and other firm characteristics. Because financial risk management is likely a 
decision based on the level of gross exposure, it would a priori not be surprising to find derivatives 
users having higher net exposures. However, there is no evidence of higher net exposures, apart from 
marginally higher net commodity price exposure for firms using commodity price derivatives. Overall, 
the evidence alleviates concerns that firms might use financial derivatives to increase levels of total 
risk or exposures to financial risks. 
While there have historically been a number of cases of huge derivatives losses (Procter & 
Gamble, Gibson Greeting Cards, Metallgesellschaft, etc.) and prominent investors such as Warren 
Buffett have characterized derivatives as dangerous financial instruments, our broad sample evidence 
documents robustly that nonfinancial firms around the globe are using financial derivatives on the 
whole quite sensibly.22 Even in the recent financial crisis, instances of problems of nonfinancial firms 
                                                 
22 While Warren Buffett referred to derivatives as “financial weapons of mass destruction” in Berkshire Hathaway’s 2002 
annual report, this remark is according to Robert Merton taken out of context and misinterpreted, since Buffett “uses 
derivatives all the time” (Redmond and Nozawa, 2016). The same news article reports that according to regulatory filings 
Berkshire Hatahway had wound down its last credit derivative contract in July 2016, but still has some positions equity 
index derivatives. 
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with derivatives have been rare.23 The uniformity across countries suggests that harmonized policy 
and regulation of derivatives markets, currently with a focus on OTC derivatives, might be adequate. 
3.4 Internationalization, Currency Exposure and Derivatives Use 
One of the most important financial exposures that firms face in the context of their international 
business activities is with regards to currency risk. In a seminal study of the exchange rate exposure 
phenomenon, Jorion (1990) investigates the effect of exchange rate risk on the return of 287 U.S. 
multinational firms based on a market model augmented with a multilateral exchange rate index. De-
spite these firms being selected due to significant international activities, the study finds that only 15 
firms or 5.2% of the sample have a significant exchange rate exposure at the 5% significance level – 
only a little more than by pure chance. Subsequently, many studies have similarly documented that the 
empirical research on nonfinancial firms typically produces fewer significant exposure estimates than 
researchers expect, independent of the sample studied and the methodology used, which has been 
referred to as the “exposure puzzle” (Bartram and Bodnar, 2007). 
Currency exposures tend to be small across firms because either they have small gross expo-
sures to start with (e.g. purely domestic companies that are not facing indirect competitive exposures) 
or they have large gross exposures but reduce these via hedging. In particular, firms use a combination 
of different hedging channels such as currency derivatives, foreign currency debt, operational hedging, 
and pass-through (Bartram, Brown and Minton, 2012; Clark and Judge, 2009; Allayannis, Ihrig and 
Weston, 2001), and the resulting net currency exposures are small. Given the inherent level of noise 
in both exchange rate changes and stock returns, these smaller exposures tend to be less likely to be 
statistically significant. However, the literature has also documented that these exposures are never-
theless still meaningful and can for instance be used to predict stock returns (Bartram and Bodnar, 
2012). 
In order to investigate how the internationalization of firms relates to their currency exposures 
and their use of currency derivatives, we identify firms with international business as those that have 
non-zero foreign sales, foreign income or foreign assets. These are firms that have underlying gross 
currency exposures and thus good reasons to use derivatives for hedging purposes. In contrast, the 
effect of currency risk on firms that have no foreign business (zero foreign sales, income or assets) is 
                                                 
23 See, for instance, Zeidan and Rodrigues (2013). 
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less obvious, and the use of currency derivatives by these firms could be driven by speculative motives. 
Still, even firms without foreign business activities may be exposed to currency risk via various indirect 
channels, such as import competition. 
We investigate the effect of currency derivatives on the absolute value of the net FX exposure 
of firms (estimated from stock return regressions as before) in Table 6 by regressing stock return 
exposures to exchange rate risk on currency derivatives and control variables. We show results for 
regressions of firms with and without foreign business as proxied by different measures (sales, income, 
assets). The results show that “multinational firms” use currency derivatives to significantly reduce the 
currency exposure of their stock returns. The coefficients are negative and statistically significant for 
all three samples of firms with international business, and the size of the coefficients is large. Do 
“domestic firms” that have no international business, however, use derivatives to take bets on curren-
cies? The three regressions for firms without foreign sales, income or assets suggest otherwise. All 
three coefficients are insignificant and thus statistically not different from zero, indicating that there 
is no difference between the currency risk exposure of domestic firms that use derivatives and those 
that do not. Thus, focusing on the important and well understood dimension of currency exposure, 
our broad sample analysis again supports the hedging hypothesis 4 and shows no evidence of firms 
using derivatives for speculative purposes. Nevertheless, the relation between derivatives usage and 
firm risk and exposures could be moderated by country characteristics, which is investigated in the 
next section. 
3.5 Corporate Governance and Derivatives Market Access 
Corporate governance and the ease with which derivatives are available may influence whether and to 
what extent nonfinancial corporations employ derivatives for hedging or speculative purposes. While 
the general importance of corporate governance has been shown in La Porta et al. (1998), we investi-
gate it here in a risk management context. In order to examine how country characteristics moderate 
the use of derivatives, we divide the sample into subsamples. The effect of shareholder rights (at the 
country level) on the relation between derivatives use and risk is explored in Table 7. Specifically, we 
estimate regressions separately for firms in countries with weak and strong shareholder rights, and 
then test for differences between the coefficients on the derivatives use variable. The regressions em-
ploy alternative measures of firm risk and exposure as dependent variables as well as derivatives usage 
and control variables as independent variables. While the p-values (in brackets) in the table refer to 
the significance level of the individual regression coefficients, the stars indicate the significance level 
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of differences in the coefficients on the derivatives variable across equations. While misaligned inter-
ests between managers and shareholders might entail sub-optimal, non-value-increasing risk manage-
ment activities, strong shareholder rights should reduce these agency costs and lead to the use of 
derivatives that is more in the interests of shareholders. 
The results suggest that firms use derivatives for hedging purposes in both countries with 
weak and strong shareholder rights. To wit, the coefficient on the derivatives variable is negative in all 
regressions with significant coefficients. However, contrary to hypothesis 5, the strength of share-
holder rights has no effect on the extent to which firms reduce total risk. At the same time, there are 
some significant differences across the subsamples with regards to some of the underlying exposures. 
In particular, in support of hypothesis 5, firms in countries with stronger shareholder rights show 
significantly larger reductions in market risk. The coefficient on the derivatives variable is -0.09 and  
-0.15 for firms in countries with weak and strong shareholder rights, respectively, which is not only a 
statistically significant but also an economically meaningful difference. In addition, firms in countries 
with strong shareholder rights have larger reductions in foreign exchange rate exposure, while the 
differences with regard to interest rate and commodity price exposures are small. Overall, these results 
further confirm that firms do not use derivatives in order to increase their risk and exposure (hypoth-
esis 4). While the strength of shareholder rights has no effect on the extent of reduction of overall 
firm risk, the reduction in exposures tends to be smaller if shareholder rights are weak, which provides 
some support to hypothesis 5 and which is consistent with small speculative components of hedging 
(e.g., ‘selective’ hedging as discussed by Stulz (1996)). 
The strength of creditor rights may also impact the relation between the use of derivatives and 
corporate risk and exposure measures, which is explored in Table 8. Stronger bondholder rights should 
mitigate the potential agency costs of debt and align the use of derivatives with the interests of credi-
tors. The coefficient on derivatives usage is negative in all subsamples, i.e. for firms in countries with 
either strong or weak creditor rights. Contrary to predictions (hypothesis 6), the reduction in stock 
return volatility is significantly larger (-0.20) in countries where creditor rights are weak compared to 
countries where creditor rights are strong (-0.04). This finding is consistent with anecdotal evidence 
of lenders in countries with weak creditor rights requiring firms to commit to an effective risk man-
agement policy when granting a loan. In line with this explanation, the fraction of firms using interest 
rate derivatives generally and interest rate swaps in particular is higher in countries with weak creditor 
rights. The effect on market betas (-0.13 vs. -0.10) and interest rate exposures (-0.01 vs. 0.00) are also 
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larger for weak creditor rights, but the differences are statistically and/or economically insignificant. 
In contrast, though in line with predictions (hypothesis 6), reductions in FX and CP exposures are 
actually larger in countries with strong creditor rights. 
Easy access to derivatives may also facilitate or induce speculative uses of derivatives by non-
financial corporations. In particular, firms located in economies with more developed and liquid de-
rivatives markets may speculate more because they have greater access to derivatives. Alternatively, 
easier access to derivatives might induce more hedging. Consequently, the relation between derivatives 
use and corporate risk measures is analyzed separately for firms with easy or difficult access to deriv-
atives. The results are presented in Table 9. The coefficient of the derivatives variable is negative for 
most subsamples with easy and difficult access to derivatives markets (and thus provides further sup-
port for hypothesis 4). Importantly, reductions in total risk are significantly larger for firms in countries 
where large derivatives markets provide easy access compared to countries with more difficult access 
(-0.16 vs. 0.02), which allows rejecting hypothesis 7. Thus, the availability of derivatives appears to 
facilitate the hedging efforts of companies. With regards to the underlying individual financial expo-
sures, however, the picture is more mixed. Reductions in interest rate risk are small but larger in coun-
tries with easy access. In contrast, for exposure to market risk and exchange rate risk, reductions are 
smaller in countries with easy access. 
Overall, these results further confirm the use of derivatives by nonfinancial firms for hedging 
purposes. In none of the subsamples across country characteristics is derivatives usage associated with 
significantly higher risk or exposure measures. In contrast, the effect is statistically significant and 
negative in most subsamples, or otherwise not different from zero. Reductions in risk (and often 
exposures) are larger for firms in countries weak creditor rights and easier access to derivatives. These 
findings are important given that these country dimensions can be affected by policy. 
4 Robustness Tests 
We examine a variety of alternative specifications and undertake additional tests to check the robust-
ness of the empirical findings. Disclosure of derivatives use is not a regulatory requirement for all 
firms in the sample, which could lead to a potential bias if the derivatives variables capture the report-
ing of derivatives use rather than derivatives use per se. In order to address this issue, the sample is 
limited to firms in countries with well-regarded accounting practices (the so-called ‘G4+1’ group con-
sisting of the U.S., the U.K., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) and firms reporting according to 
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IAS. For the resulting sample of 4,644 firms, disclosure of derivatives is mandatory. Table 10 docu-
ments that the results for this subsample are very similar to the findings for the whole sample. Most 
importantly, the relation of derivatives use with firm risk and exposure is very robust to the reporting 
requirement and, if anything, is slightly stronger. 
Another potential concern is that additional risk factors identified by the asset pricing literature 
might be correlated with the financial risks we examine. For example, if the Fama-French (1993) or 
momentum (Carhart, 1997) factors are correlated with currency, interest rates or commodity price 
fluctuations, then our analysis might be commenting on these factor loadings for individual firms 
instead of the financial risks we seek to analyze. To examine this possibility, we augment Equation (1) 
by the return on the world market index and standard factors to capture size, value and momentum 
effects. Utilizing the net risk measures from this estimation results in consistently negative values for 
the derivatives variables for exposures to currency, interest rate and commodity price risk, though they 
are on average slightly smaller in magnitude than those reported in Table 4. The coefficient on the 
local market beta is smaller (-0.023) and only marginally significant, while the coefficients on the ad-
ditional risk exposures are all negative and significant for size and value factors. 
The robustness of the results is also investigated by employing alternative variables or regres-
sors that reduce the sample size. Consistent with monetary incentives to reduce managerial risk aver-
sion, stock options are positively associated with stock return volatility as well as financial exposures. 
In particular, coefficients for the stock option variable are positive and statistically significant for all 
of the risk and exposure measures. The coefficients of the derivatives variables remain negative and 
significant in all alternative specifications. In addition, the percentage of closely held shares of a firm 
(Closely Held Pct) is significantly negatively related to stock return volatility and market betas, which is 
consistent with effective monitoring leading to lower risk.24 
Finally, we also estimate a simultaneous equations model that considers the interactions 
beween firm risk/exposure and the likelihood of a firm to use derivatives, following Graham and 
Rogers (2002), Bartram, Brown and Fehle (2009) and Gay, Lin and Smith (2011). The results in Panel 
A of Table 11 show that derivatives usage is still negative and significant for all measures of firm risk 
and exposure (in line with hypothesis 4). In addition, most of the significant coefficients for other 
                                                 
24 Supanvanij and Strauss (2010) find that hedging by U.S. firms is negatively related to exercisable options compensation. 
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variables have the same sign as reported in Table 4. Panel B of Table 11 shows the coefficients and 
marginal effects of a logit model for derivatives use. The specification follows the risk management 
literature (e.g. Géczy, Minton and Schrand, 1997), but given the use of endogenous variables, tries to 
limit the overlap of independent variables with the risk regressions in Panel A. The results indicate 
that measures of firm risk are also a significant determinant of the use of derivatives, with firms that 
exhibit high net exposures being less likely to use derivatives. The coefficients and significance levels 
of the other determinants of derivatives use are overall consistent with those in the prior literature. 
We also perform all analyses in the paper using three-year (or, alternatively, five-year) averages 
of the accounting data, whenever data for several years is available, or using lagged regressors as alter-
native ways of addressing endogeneity concerns (Chen and King, 2014; Chen 2011). The tenor of all 
previous results remains unchanged. Moreover, users of derivatives have generally lower levels of risk 
and exposure after the introduction of the Euro in 1999, as an exogenous shock, compared to non-
users (except for commodity price risk). 
5 Conclusion 
In the wake of recent efforts to regulate derivatives markets, many end-users are concerned about 
their ability to effectively use derivatives due to more limited access and higher costs. An interesting 
and important question is what the likely effect of the new regulation will be on corporate risk, since 
derivatives are very versatile financial instruments that can be used equally well for hedging as well as 
speculation. While surveys of corporate derivatives’ usage indicate that many corporations use deriv-
atives at least occasionally in order to take positions depending on their market view, most of the 
academic risk management literature assumes a hedging motive for corporate derivatives use. To il-
lustrate, a significant literature has tested various theories of how hedging at the firm level can increase 
shareholder value in the presence of capital market imperfections using the use of derivatives by firms 
to classify these firms as hedgers. To this end, this paper analyzes the relation between the use of 
financial derivatives at the firm level and various corporate risk measures to assess whether the use of 
derivatives by nonfinancial firms is indeed consistent with hedging, or whether firms use these instru-
ments with speculative motives. For regulators, policy makers, shareholders and other corporate stake-
holders alike, it is important to be aware of the risk management practices of nonfinancial firms and 
the concomitant effects on firm risk and value. 
For a sample comprising 6,896 firms from 47 countries, this paper documents that firms use 
derivatives to reduce risk. There is no evidence of corporate speculation with derivatives for firms in 
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individual countries or for different types of derivatives, except for marginally higher net commodity 
price exposure of firms using commodity price derivatives. These results are consistent across differ-
ent countries and robust to controlling for the level of gross exposure and differences in country risk, 
such as exchange rate or interest rate volatility, political risk and trade dependency. Firms use deriva-
tives for hedging purposes independent of country-level corporate governance or access to derivatives. 
At the same time, derivatives users in countries with strong creditor rights have lower reductions of 
their stock return volatility, while the reduction in risk is larger in countries with easier access to de-
rivatives. 
This is consistent with the assertions of some policy makers that derivatives could be im-
portant in limiting the severity of economic downturns in developing economies with typically less 
liquid derivatives markets. Consequently, it is likely that financial policy makers could facilitate corpo-
rate hedging activities by pursuing strategies that encourage the development of local-currency deriv-
atives markets. Our results suggest that nonfinancial firms overall employ derivatives with the motive 
and effect of risk reduction, despite the fact that – according to questionnaires – they occasionally take 
positions with derivatives or adjust the size and timing of their derivatives position depending on their 
market view. These speculative aspects of derivatives use appear minor overall, relative to the domi-
nant effect of reducing corporate exposures to financial risks. 
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Figure 1: Notional Amounts Outstanding Over Time 
 
The figure shows the notional amounts outstanding (in trillions of USD) by year of exchange rate, interest rate and com-
modity price derivatives, separately for OTC and exchange-traded derivatives. The data is from the Bank for International 
Settlements. 
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Table 1: Derivatives’ Risk Categories and Instruments 
 
The table shows the notional amounts outstanding (in trillions of USD as of 31 December 2016) by underlying and in-
strument. The data is from the Bank for International Settlements. 
 
 
Risk Category Instrument
Notional Amount Oustanding 
(trillion of USD)
Interest Rate Contracts Interest rate swaps 275.2                                                
Forward rate agreements 60.7                                                  
Options 32.2                                                  
Other 0.3                                                    
All OTC 368.4                                               
Options 51.0                                                  
Futures 32.9                                                  
All Exchange-Traded 83.9                                                 
All Interest Rate Contracts 452.3                                               
Foreign Exchange Contracts Forwards and swaps 37.2                                                  
Currency swaps 20.9                                                  
Options 10.5                                                  
Other 0.0                                                    
All OTC 68.6                                                 
Futures 0.2                                                    
Options 0.1                                                    
All Exchange-Traded 0.4                                                   
All Exchange Rate Contracts 69.0                                                 
Commodity Price Contracts Forwards and Swaps 1.0                                                    
Options 0.4                                                    
All Commodity Price Contracts 1.3                                                    
Equity-linked Contracts Options 3.6                                                    
Forwards and Swaps 2.5                                                    
All Equity-Linked Contracts 6.1                                                    
Credit Default Swaps Single-name Instruments 5.6                                                    
Multi-name Instruments 4.3                                                    
All CDS contracts 9.9                                                   
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Table 2: Derivatives Use and Risk Measures 
 
The table shows the number of observations (N), mean, median and standard deviation (Std.Dev.) of different risk char-
acteristics for derivatives users and derivatives non-users. The last column presents p-values of Wilcoxon rank sum tests 
between derivatives users and non-users. All variables are defined in Table A-1 in the appendix. 
 
 
 
Wilcoxon
Variable N Mean Median Std.Dev. N Mean Median Std.Dev. p -value
Gross Exposure
Gross-FX-Exposure 4,172      0.621 1.000 0.490 2,724 0.395 0.000 0.490 0.000
Foreign Debt 4,172      0.882 1.000 0.320 2,724 0.725 1.000 0.450 0.000
Leverage 4,092      0.297 0.254 0.240 2,644 0.189 0.081 0.240 0.000
Gross-CP-Exposure 4,172      0.157 0.000 0.360 2,724 0.082 0.000 0.270 0.000
Country Risk
IR-Country 4,166      1.099 0.844 0.590 2,718 1.151 0.844 0.580 0.000
FX-Country 4,166      0.042 0.049 0.020 2,718 0.038 0.033 0.020 0.000
LogEXIM/GDP 4,169      3.802 4.024 0.780 2,722 4.152 4.130 0.940 0.000
ICR-Composite 4,169      83.28 84.25 4.000 2,723 82.28 84.25 4.370 0.000
ICR-Financial 4,169      38.46 37.00 3.750 2,723 38.91 37.00 3.460 0.000
ICR-Economic 4,169      42.19 42.00 2.130 2,723 42.15 42.00 2.040 0.000
ICR-Political 4,169      85.92 90.00 7.370 2,723 83.50 88.00 8.970 0.000
LogGDP 4,171      28.01 27.98 1.680 2,724 27.60 27.89 1.740 0.000
Net Risk/Exposure
Std.Dev. 4,172      2.377 2.136 1.060 2,724 2.846 2.697 1.260 0.000
Beta 4,042      0.679 0.532 0.570 2,620 0.734 0.614 0.590 0.000
Net-FX-Exposure 4,042      0.569 0.384 0.580 2,620 0.786 0.561 0.720 0.000
Net-IR-Exposure 4,042      0.078 0.044 0.100 2,620 0.099 0.052 0.120 0.000
Net-CP-Exposure 4,042      0.120 0.083 0.120 2,620 0.141 0.106 0.130 0.000
Derivatives Users Derivatives Non-Users
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Table 3: Determinants of Derivatives Use 
 
The table reports regression marginal effects and their significance levels from probit regressions of the relationship between the likelihood of general derivatives use, 
proxies of incentives for derivatives use, proxies of exposure, and control variables. Marginal effects are calculated as the change in the probability of using derivatives 
that comes from a change in the exogenous variable of interest from (mean - 0.5 Std.Dev.) to (mean + 0.5 Std.Dev.), where all other variables are evaluated at the mean. 
Below the coefficients, information about the goodness of fit and the number of observations are reported. R-Square is the generalized coefficient of determination 
proposed by Cox and Snell (1989, pp. 208 -209). ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. All regressions use country, industry and 
year fixed effects. All variables are defined in Table A-1 in the appendix. 
 
Leverage 0.047 *** 0.073 *** 0.038 0.079 ** 0.158 *** 0.088 *** 0.041 0.019
Coverage (3y) -0.010 -0.005 -0.033 * 0.018 0.046 0.027 -0.059 ** -0.032 **
Quick Ratio -0.026 *** -0.050 *** -0.014 0.101 * -0.085 ** -0.003 0.041 ** 0.006
Logsize 0.131 *** 0.123 *** 0.141 *** 0.073 ** 0.215 *** 0.151 *** 0.062 *** 0.144 ***
Dividend 0.055 *** 0.069 *** 0.116 *** 0.063 0.008 0.041 0.055 ** 0.057 ***
GrossProfitMargin (3y) 0.017 ** 0.004 -0.003 -0.022 0.076 0.059 ** 0.067 *** 0.006
Income Tax Credit 0.031 *** 0.034 *** 0.017 0.162 -0.018 0.015 -0.010 0.029 *
Market-to-Book -0.034 *** -0.018 -0.042 ** -0.020 -0.041 -0.080 * -0.027 -0.033 **
Market-to-Book*Leverage 0.025 *** 0.035 ** 0.081 ** 0.008 -0.125 * 0.054 0.076 * 0.018
Multiple Share Classes 0.036 *** 0.034 *** 0.024 0.000 0.018 0.020 0.255 0.075 ***
Stock Options 0.030 *** 0.144 *** 0.008 -0.004 0.018 0.007 -0.017 0.015
Gross-FX-Exposure 0.039 *** 0.071 *** 0.058 *** 0.041 0.089 ** -0.004 -0.002 0.037 ***
Foreign Debt 0.055 *** 0.031 *** 0.115 *** 0.170 *** 0.143 *** 0.047 0.093 *** 0.118 ***
Intercept -0.468 *** -1.083 *** -0.902 * -0.978 ** -1.303 *** -0.028 -0.446 -1.095 ***
R-Square 0.165 0.214 0.263 0.205 0.326 0.212 0.261 0.157
Observations 6,220 1,934 814 363 287 431 244 2,147
All Countries Australia All OtherUnited States United Kingdom Japan GermanyCanada
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Table 4: Regressions of Corporate Risk Measures on Derivatives Use 
 
The table reports regression coefficients and their p-values (in brackets) from OLS regressions of corporate risk measures 
on derivatives use and control variables. Below the coefficients, information about the adjusted R2 and the number of 
observations is reported. Panel A shows full results for general derivatives use. Panel B shows results for regressions with 
foreign exchange rate, interest rate and commodity price derivatives. For brevity the panel displays only the coefficient on 
the derivatives variable. Std.Dev. is the standardized standard deviation of local currency stock returns. Beta, Net-FX-
Exposure, Net-IR-Exposure and Net-CP-Exposure are the coefficients of regressions of stock returns on market index 
returns, exchange rate changes, short-term interest rate changes and commodity price changes. Regressions with exchange 
rate, interest rate and commodity price exposures use the absolute value of the coefficient as dependent variable. All 
regressions include industry and year fixed effects. Standard errors are corrected with the Newey-West (1987) method. 
The table also reports results and test statistics from an instrumental variables approach and a treatment effects model. All 
variables are defined in Table A-1 in the appendix. 
 
Panel A: General Derivatives 
 
 
(contined) 
  
Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value
OLS Estimates
Derivatives -0.112 [0.00] -0.072 [0.00] -0.072 [0.00] -0.001 [0.66] -0.010 [0.00]
Gross-FX-Exposure 0.021 [0.43] 0.013 [0.32] 0.024 [0.18] -0.009 [0.00] 0.001 [0.72]
Foreign Debt 0.098 [0.00] 0.010 [0.53] -0.009 [0.72] 0.001 [0.80] 0.002 [0.60]
Leverage 0.001 [0.99] -0.419 [0.00] 0.018 [0.65] -0.007 [0.23] 0.000 [0.98]
Logsize -0.094 [0.00] 0.114 [0.00] -0.006 [0.34] -0.003 [0.00] -0.002 [0.04]
NumIndSeg -0.012 [0.07] -0.001 [0.81] -0.012 [0.01] -0.002 [0.00] -0.001 [0.22]
Book-to-Market -0.017 [0.42] 0.028 [0.00] 0.010 [0.48] 0.002 [0.25] -0.001 [0.70]
Dividend -0.906 [0.00] -0.356 [0.00] -0.274 [0.00] -0.038 [0.00] -0.049 [0.00]
LogEXIM/GDP -0.137 [0.00] -0.037 [0.00] 0.053 [0.00] -0.007 [0.00] -0.004 [0.03]
IR-Country -0.108 [0.00] -0.032 [0.01] 0.250 [0.00] 0.021 [0.00] 0.021 [0.00]
ICR-Political 0.004 [0.02] -0.012 [0.00] -0.008 [0.00] 0.001 [0.00] 0.000 [0.15]
Intercept 4.219 [0.00] 1.759 [0.00] 1.106 [0.00] 0.026 [0.16] 0.137 [0.00]
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.40 0.15 0.24 0.17
Observations 6,703 6,497 6,497 6,497 6,497 
Instrumental Variables Model
Derivatives -0.483 [0.00] -0.437 [0.00] -0.327 [0.00] -0.038 [0.00] -0.002 [0.85]
Underidentification test (LM statistic) (χ2) 1,118 [0.00] 974    [0.00] 974    [0.00] 974    [0.00] 974    [0.00]
Weak identification test (Stock and Yogo) (F -test) 669    [0.00] 572    [0.00] 572    [0.00] 572    [0.00] 572    [0.00]
Overidentification test (Sargan statistic) (χ2) 0.07   [0.79] 1.04 [0.31] 0.53 [0.47] 0.07 [0.80] 0.15 [0.70]
Treatment Effects Model
Derivatives -0.614 [0.00] -0.409 [0.00] -0.898 [0.00] -0.056 [0.00] -0.096 [0.00]
Wald test: all coefficients = 0 (χ2) 5,177 [0.00] 4,741 [0.00] 2,000 [0.00] 2,874 [0.00] 2,257 [0.00]
Heckman's λ 0.319 [0.00] 0.211 [0.00] 0.522 [0.00] 0.034 [0.00] 0.054 [0.00]
ExposuresTotal Risk
Std.Dev. Beta Net-FX-Exposure Net-IR-Exposure Net-CP-Exposure
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Table 4: Regressions of Corporate Risk Measures on Derivatives Use (continued) 
 
Panel B: Currency, Interest Rate and Commodity Price Derivatives 
 
 
Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value
OLS Estimates
FX-Derivatives 0.001 [0.97] -0.032 [0.02] -0.085 [0.00] -0.002 [0.57] -0.007 [0.03]
IR-Derivatives -0.135 [0.00] -0.116 [0.00] -0.030 [0.09] -0.003 [0.23] -0.010 [0.00]
CP-Derivatives -0.070 [0.06] -0.069 [0.00] -0.015 [0.56] 0.003 [0.45] 0.011 [0.07]
Instrumental Variables Model
FX-Derivatives -0.571 [0.00] -0.524 [0.00] -0.398 [0.00] -0.045 [0.00] -0.002 [0.88]
IR-Derivatives -1.425 [0.00] -1.269 [0.00] -0.965 [0.00] -0.110 [0.00] -0.004 [0.88]
CP-Derivatives -2.132 [0.00] -1.922 [0.00] -1.307 [0.00] -0.154 [0.00] -0.014 [0.74]
Treatment Effects Model
FX-Derivatives -0.130 [0.09] -0.343 [0.00] -0.919 [0.00] -0.058 [0.00] -0.089 [0.00]
IR-Derivatives -0.151 [0.08] -0.502 [0.00] -0.394 [0.00] -0.029 [0.00] -0.057 [0.00]
CP-Derivatives 0.092 [0.44] -0.157 [0.01] 0.043 [0.61] -0.001 [0.95] 0.109 [0.00]
Total Risk Exposures
Std.Dev. Beta Net-FX-Exposure Net-IR-Exposure Net-CP-Exposure
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Table 5: Regressions of Corporate Risk Measures on Derivatives Use By Country 
 
The table reports regression coefficients and their p-values (in brackets) from OLS regressions of corporate risk measures on derivatives use and control variables. It also 
reports the number of observations by type of risk measure. Regressions are run separately by country. Alternative dependent variables are the standardized standard 
deviation of local currency stock returns, as well as the coefficients of regressions of stock returns on market index returns (Beta), exchange rate changes (Net-FX-
Exposure), short-term interest rate changes (Net-IR-Exposure) and commodity price changes (Net-CP-Exposure). Regressions with exchange rate, interest rate and 
commodity price exposures use the absolute value of the coefficient as dependent variable. The independent variables are the same as in Table 4, however, for brevity 
the table displays only the coefficient on the derivatives variable. Standard errors are corrected with the Newey-West (1987) method. All regressions include industry and 
year fixed effects. All variables are defined in Table A-1 in the appendix. 
 
 
Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value
Std.Dev. -0.221 [0.00] -0.025 [0.77] -0.214 [0.03] 0.044 [0.62] -0.010 [0.90] -0.775 [0.00] -0.041 [0.33]
Beta -0.104 [0.00] -0.022 [0.60] -0.022 [0.63] 0.056 [0.38] -0.047 [0.44] -0.207 [0.01] -0.122 [0.00]
Net-FX-Exposure -0.029 [0.44] -0.019 [0.51] -0.094 [0.13] -0.082 [0.30] 0.010 [0.82] -0.020 [0.63] -0.166 [0.00]
Net-IR-Exposure -0.007 [0.31] 0.000 [0.95] 0.006 [0.64] 0.002 [0.85] 0.000 [0.65] -0.027 [0.11] 0.005 [0.20]
Net-CP-Exposure -0.011 [0.13] -0.008 [0.36] -0.004 [0.75] -0.007 [0.66] -0.003 [0.83] -0.013 [0.41] -0.012 [0.01]
Observations 2,032      852         499          394         366         274         2,080      
All OtherUnited States United Kingdom Canada Germany Japan Australia
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Table 6: Foreign Exchange Rate Exposure and Currency Derivatives 
 
The table reports regression coefficients and their p-values (in brackets) from OLS regressions of Net-FX-Exposure on 
derivatives use and control variables. Below the coefficients, information about the adjusted R2 and the number of obser-
vations is reported. Net-FX-Exposure are the exchange rate coefficients of a regression of stock returns on market index 
returns, exchange rate changes, short-term interest rate changes and commodity price changes. Regressions use the abso-
lute value of the coefficient as dependent variable. All regressions use industry and year fixed effects. Standard errors are 
corrected with the Newey-West (1987) method. The table shows results separately for regressions with firms that have 
non-zero foreign sales, foreign income and foreign assets, respectively, and those with zero values of these variables. All 
variables are defined in Table A-1 in the appendix. 
 
 
 
 
Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value
FX-Derivatives -0.063 [0.01] -0.103 [0.00] -0.058 [0.04] -0.028 [0.59] -0.049 [0.34] -0.042 [0.39]
Foreign Debt 0.020 [0.66] 0.071 [0.34] 0.037 [0.60] 0.001 [0.98] 0.023 [0.62] -0.001 [0.98]
Leverage 0.012 [0.81] 0.014 [0.84] 0.006 [0.91] -0.058 [0.55] -0.057 [0.55] -0.042 [0.65]
Logsize -0.009 [0.17] -0.001 [0.89] -0.017 [0.04] -0.021 [0.15] -0.015 [0.29] -0.018 [0.21]
NumIndSeg -0.013 [0.02] -0.005 [0.51] -0.001 [0.85] -0.009 [0.48] -0.007 [0.61] -0.004 [0.74]
Book-to-Market 0.008 [0.62] -0.001 [0.95] 0.003 [0.88] 0.015 [0.62] 0.022 [0.48] 0.023 [0.44]
Dividend -0.245 [0.00] -0.261 [0.00] -0.261 [0.00] -0.290 [0.00] -0.296 [0.00] -0.269 [0.00]
LogEXIM/GDP 0.058 [0.00] 0.058 [0.01] 0.045 [0.01] -0.021 [0.52] -0.013 [0.69] -0.020 [0.55]
IR-Country 0.306 [0.00] 0.351 [0.00] 0.309 [0.00] 0.232 [0.00] 0.251 [0.00] 0.267 [0.00]
ICR-Political -0.012 [0.00] -0.013 [0.00] -0.011 [0.00] -0.006 [0.03] -0.006 [0.05] -0.007 [0.02]
Intercept 1.337 [0.00] 1.308 [0.00] 1.272 [0.00] 1.266 [0.00] 1.130 [0.00] 1.170 [0.00]
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.23 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16
Observations 3,547  1,797  2,219  1,144  1,195  1,248  
Foreign Assets
Firms with Firms without
Foreign Sales Foreign Income Foreign Assets Foreign Sales Foreign Income
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Table 7: Derivatives Usage and Shareholder Rights 
 
The table reports regression coefficients and their p-values (in brackets) from OLS regressions of corporate risk measures on derivatives use and control variables. Regressions 
distinguish between environments of weak or strong shareholder rights. Shareholder rights are strong for firms where shareholder rights are above the median across countries. 
Below the coefficients, information about the adjusted R2 and the number of observations is reported. *, **, and *** indicate that the coefficient of the derivatives variable is 
significantly different for subsamples with strong and weak shareholder rights at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. Standard errors are corrected with the 
Newey-West (1987) method. Std.Dev. is the standardized standard deviation of local currency stock returns. Beta, Net-FX-Exposure, Net-IR-Exposure and Net-CP-Exposure 
are the coefficients of regressions of stock returns on market index returns, exchange rate changes, short-term interest rate changes and commodity price changes. Regressions 
with exchange rate, interest rate and commodity price exposures use the absolute value of the coefficient as dependent variable. All regressions include country, industry and year 
fixed effects. All variables are defined in Table A-1 in the appendix. 
 
 
 
 
Variable Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value
Derivatives -0.08 [0.10] -0.08 [0.03] -0.09 [0.00] *** -0.15 [0.00] -0.09 [0.00] *** -0.16 [0.00] 0.00 [0.88] 0.00 [0.85] 0.00 [0.97] * -0.01 [0.07]
Gross-FX-Exposure 0.06 [0.15] 0.02 [0.50] 0.01 [0.59] 0.05 [0.00] 0.01 [0.71] 0.06 [0.01] 0.00 [0.60] 0.00 [0.24] 0.00 [0.81] 0.00 [0.34]
Foreign Debt 0.08 [0.21] 0.13 [0.00] 0.04 [0.17] 0.09 [0.00] 0.07 [0.08] -0.03 [0.28] 0.01 [0.26] -0.02 [0.00] 0.00 [0.73] 0.00 [0.75]
Leverage -0.40 [0.00] -0.26 [0.00] -0.66 [0.00] -0.50 [0.00] -0.04 [0.43] -0.01 [0.84] -0.04 [0.00] -0.03 [0.00] -0.02 [0.08] -0.01 [0.35]
Logsize -0.07 [0.00] -0.09 [0.00] 0.11 [0.00] 0.11 [0.00] -0.04 [0.00] 0.01 [0.02] -0.01 [0.00] 0.00 [0.00] 0.00 [0.06] 0.00 [0.13]
NumIndSeg -0.04 [0.00] -0.04 [0.00] 0.01 [0.04] 0.01 [0.00] -0.01 [0.08] 0.00 [0.46] -0.01 [0.00] 0.00 [0.00] 0.00 [0.00] 0.00 [0.00]
Book-to-Market -0.09 [0.03] -0.06 [0.03] 0.00 [0.92] 0.02 [0.09] -0.05 [0.04] 0.05 [0.00] 0.00 [0.79] 0.00 [0.47] 0.00 [0.63] 0.00 [0.45]
Dividend -1.13 [0.00] -1.09 [0.00] -0.42 [0.00] -0.46 [0.00] -0.26 [0.00] -0.37 [0.00] -0.05 [0.00] -0.05 [0.00] -0.06 [0.00] -0.06 [0.00]
Intercept 3.77 [0.00] 3.81 [0.00] 0.4 [0.00] 0.36 [0.00] 1.07 [0.00] 0.77 [0.00] 0.19 [0.00] 0.09 [0.00] 0.19 [0.00] 0.16 [0.00]
Adjusted R2 0.37 0.32 0.25 0.26 0.13 0.10 0.23 0.23 0.13 0.08
Observations 2,507  4,201  2,357  4,140  2,357  4,140  2,357  4,140  2,357  4,140  
Total Risk Exposures
Std.Dev. Beta Net-FX-Exposure Net-IR-Exposure Net-CP-Exposure
weak strong weak strong weak strong weak strong weak strong
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Table 8: Derivatives Usage and Creditor Rights 
 
The table reports regression coefficients and their p-values (in brackets) from OLS regressions of corporate risk measures on derivatives use and control variables. Regressions 
distinguish between environments of weak or strong creditor rights. Creditor rights are strong for firms where creditor rights are greater than the median across countries. Below 
the coefficients, information about the adjusted R2 and the number of observations is reported. *, **, and *** indicate that the coefficient of the derivatives variable is significantly 
different for subsamples with strong and weak creditor rights at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. Standard errors are corrected with the Newey-West (1987) 
method. Std.Dev. is the standardized standard deviation of local currency stock returns. Beta, Net-FX-Exposure, Net-IR-Exposure and Net-CP-Exposure are the coefficients of 
regressions of stock returns on market index returns, exchange rate changes, short-term interest rate changes and commodity price changes. Regressions with exchange rate, 
interest rate and commodity price exposures use the absolute value of the coefficient as dependent variable. All regressions include country, industry and year fixed effects. All 
variables are defined in Table A-1 in the appendix. 
 
 
 
Variable Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value
Derivatives -0.20 [0.00] *** -0.04 [0.29] -0.13 [0.00] -0.10 [0.00] -0.07 [0.01] *** -0.18 [0.00] -0.01 [0.11] *** 0.00 [0.96] 0.00 [0.83] *** -0.01 [0.00]
Gross-FX-Exposure -0.05 [0.18] 0.13 [0.00] 0.06 [0.00] 0.02 [0.29] 0.05 [0.07] 0.03 [0.18] -0.01 [0.09] 0.00 [0.25] 0.00 [0.89] 0.00 [0.45]
Foreign Debt 0.23 [0.00] 0.10 [0.07] 0.05 [0.02] 0.07 [0.01] -0.05 [0.09] 0.14 [0.00] 0.00 [0.59] 0.01 [0.04] 0.00 [0.68] 0.01 [0.07]
Leverage -0.53 [0.00] -0.13 [0.06] -0.75 [0.00] -0.39 [0.00] -0.04 [0.50] -0.01 [0.77] -0.02 [0.03] -0.02 [0.00] -0.02 [0.04] 0.00 [0.83]
Logsize -0.16 [0.00] -0.05 [0.00] 0.12 [0.00] 0.10 [0.00] 0.00 [0.91] -0.02 [0.00] -0.01 [0.00] 0.00 [0.17] 0.00 [0.60] 0.00 [0.00]
NumIndSeg -0.01 [0.30] -0.04 [0.00] 0.00 [0.96] 0.02 [0.00] -0.03 [0.00] 0.01 [0.03] 0.00 [0.01] 0.00 [0.00] -0.01 [0.00] 0.00 [0.87]
Book-to-Market 0.00 [0.91] -0.08 [0.00] 0.01 [0.52] 0.02 [0.07] -0.03 [0.17] 0.05 [0.01] 0.00 [0.97] 0.00 [0.13] 0.00 [0.93] 0.00 [0.20]
Dividend -1.15 [0.00] -0.94 [0.00] -0.50 [0.00] -0.38 [0.00] -0.33 [0.00] -0.28 [0.00] -0.05 [0.00] -0.04 [0.00] -0.06 [0.00] -0.05 [0.00]
Intercept 4.49 [0.00] 3.22 [0.00] 0.40 [0.00] 0.34 [0.00] 0.95 [0.00] 0.78 [0.00] 0.16 [0.00] 0.09 [0.00] 0.19 [0.00] 0.16 [0.00]
Adjusted R2 0.40 0.30 0.32 0.18 0.11 0.11 0.22 0.14 0.07 0.10
Observations 3,321  3,387  3,258  3,239  3,258  3,239  3,258  3,239  3,258  3,239  
Total Risk Exposures
Std.Dev. Beta Net-FX-Exposure Net-IR-Exposure Net-CP-Exposure
strong weak strong weak strongweak strong weak strong weak
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Table 9: Derivatives Usage and Derivative Market Access 
 
The table reports regression coefficients and their p-values (in brackets) from OLS regressions of corporate risk measures on derivatives use and control variables. Regressions 
distinguish between environments of easy and difficult market access to derivatives. Access to derivatives is easy for firms where derivatives market rank is greater than the median 
across countries. Below the coefficients, information about the adjusted R2 and the number of observations is reported. *, **, and *** indicate that the coefficient of the derivatives 
variable is significantly different for subsamples with easy and difficult access to derivatives at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. Standard errors are corrected 
with the Newey-West (1987) method. Std.Dev. is the standardized standard deviation of local currency stock returns. Beta, Net-FX-Exposure, Net-IR-Exposure and Net-CP-
Exposure are the coefficients of regressions of stock returns on market index returns, exchange rate changes, short-term interest rate changes and commodity price changes. 
Regressions with exchange rate, interest rate and commodity price exposures use the absolute value of the coefficient as dependent variable. All regressions include country, 
industry and year fixed effects. All variables are defined in Table A-1 in the appendix. 
 
 
 
Variable Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value
Derivatives -0.16 [0.00] *** 0.02 [0.64] -0.09 [0.00] ** -0.13 [0.00] -0.06 [0.03] *** -0.18 [0.00] -0.01 [0.05] *** 0.01 [0.00] 0.00 [0.51] -0.01 [0.17]
Gross-FX-Exposure 0.09 [0.02] 0.01 [0.75] 0.06 [0.01] 0.02 [0.30] -0.02 [0.37] 0.09 [0.00] -0.01 [0.22] 0.00 [0.29] 0.00 [0.84] 0.00 [0.65]
Foreign Debt 0.11 [0.01] 0.00 [0.96] 0.08 [0.00] 0.05 [0.09] -0.02 [0.50] 0.12 [0.00] -0.01 [0.14] 0.00 [0.58] 0.00 [1.00] 0.00 [0.72]
Leverage -0.64 [0.00] -0.08 [0.32] -0.73 [0.00] -0.39 [0.00] -0.07 [0.22] 0.03 [0.63] -0.03 [0.00] -0.02 [0.03] -0.03 [0.02] 0.00 [0.65]
Logsize -0.03 [0.00] -0.12 [0.00] 0.12 [0.00] 0.10 [0.00] 0.02 [0.00] -0.04 [0.00] 0.00 [0.00] -0.01 [0.00] 0.00 [0.03] 0.00 [0.00]
NumIndSeg -0.04 [0.00] -0.04 [0.00] -0.02 [0.00] 0.03 [0.00] -0.02 [0.01] 0.00 [0.43] 0.00 [0.86] -0.01 [0.00] 0.00 [0.00] 0.00 [0.00]
Book-to-Market 0.04 [0.29] -0.13 [0.00] 0.04 [0.02] -0.02 [0.19] 0.02 [0.27] 0.01 [0.55] 0.01 [0.01] -0.01 [0.01] 0.00 [0.46] 0.00 [0.14]
Dividend -1.12 [0.00] -1.04 [0.00] -0.54 [0.00] -0.31 [0.00] -0.39 [0.00] -0.25 [0.00] -0.06 [0.00] -0.04 [0.00] -0.06 [0.00] -0.06 [0.00]
Intercept 3.46 [0.00] 4.11 [0.00] 0.40 [0.00] 0.36 [0.00] 0.80 [0.00] 0.88 [0.00] 0.08 [0.00] 0.16 [0.00] 0.16 [0.00] 0.18 [0.00]
Adjusted R2 0.40 0.31 0.33 0.18 0.11 0.11 0.23 0.20 0.07 0.11
Observations 3,278  3,430  3,278  3,219  3,278  3,219  3,278  3,219  3,278  3,219  
Total Risk Exposures
Std.Dev. Beta Net-FX-Exposure Net-IR-Exposure Net-CP-Exposure
difficult easy difficult easy difficulteasy difficult easy difficult easy
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Table 10: Regressions for G4+1 Countries 
 
The table reports regression coefficients and their p-values (in brackets) from OLS regressions of corporate risk measures 
on general derivatives use and control variables. Below the coefficients, information about the adjusted R2 and the number 
of observations is reported. Std.Dev. is the standardized standard deviation of local currency stock returns. Beta, Net-FX-
Exposure, Net-IR-Exposure and Net-CP-Exposure are the coefficients of regressions of stock returns on market index 
returns, exchange rate changes, short-term interest rate changes and commodity price changes. Regressions with exchange 
rate, interest rate and commodity price exposures use the absolute value of the coefficient as dependent variable. Standard 
errors are corrected with the Newey-West (1987) method. All regressions include country, industry and year fixed effects. 
The table is based on firms in G4+1 countries and those complying with IAS. All variables are defined in Table A-1 in the 
appendix. 
 
 
Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value
Derivatives -0.063 [0.04] -0.026 [0.12] -0.071 [0.00] -0.008 [0.02] -0.010 [0.01]
Gross-FX-Exposure 0.033 [0.28] 0.015 [0.34] 0.019 [0.33] -0.012 [0.00] 0.000 [0.95]
Foreign Debt 0.071 [0.05] 0.017 [0.36] 0.032 [0.22] 0.010 [0.03] 0.016 [0.00]
Leverage -0.011 [0.88] -0.419 [0.00] 0.011 [0.81] -0.014 [0.06] -0.013 [0.14]
Logsize -0.104 [0.00] 0.108 [0.00] -0.019 [0.00] -0.002 [0.02] -0.003 [0.01]
NumIndSeg -0.030 [0.00] -0.011 [0.01] -0.008 [0.12] 0.001 [0.18] 0.000 [0.78]
Book-to-Market 0.014 [0.61] 0.012 [0.29] 0.001 [0.96] 0.007 [0.02] 0.004 [0.20]
Dividend -0.724 [0.00] -0.285 [0.00] -0.283 [0.00] -0.047 [0.00] -0.052 [0.00]
LogEXIM/GDP -0.010 [0.64] -0.014 [0.26] -0.011 [0.44] 0.007 [0.01] -0.003 [0.22]
IR-Country -0.190 [0.00] -0.096 [0.00] 0.354 [0.00] 0.046 [0.00] 0.028 [0.00]
ICR-Political -0.003 [0.16] -0.001 [0.46] -0.011 [0.00] 0.000 [0.23] 0.000 [0.65]
Intercept 0.878 [0.00] 0.400 [0.00] 1.343 [0.00] -0.007 [0.74] 0.108 [0.00]
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.17 0.17 0.23 0.10
Observations 4,644       4,577       4,577        4,577       4,577       
Total Risk Exposures
Std.Dev. Beta Net-FX-Exposure Net-IR-Exposure Net-CP-Exposure
49 
Table 11: Examination of Risk Measures and Derivatives Use in Simultaneous Equations Model 
 
The table reports in Panel A coefficients and corresponding p-values (in brackets) of OLS regressions of corporate risk measures on general derivatives use and control 
variables. Below the coefficients, information about the adjusted R2 and the number of observations is reported. Std.Dev. is the standardized standard deviation of local 
currency stock returns. Beta, Net-FX-Exposure, Net-IR-Exposure and Net-CP-Exposure are the coefficients of regressions of stock returns on market index returns, 
exchange rate changes, short-term interest rate changes and commodity price changes. Regressions with exchange rate, interest rate and commodity price exposures use 
the absolute value of the coefficient as dependent variable. Panel B shows regression coefficients, their marginal effects and p-values (in brackets) from logit regressions 
of the relation between the likelihood of general derivatives use, firm-specific and country-specific proxies of incentives for hedging, proxies of exposure, and control 
variables. Marginal effects (MarEff) are calculated as the change in the probability of using derivatives that comes from a change in the exogenous variable of interest 
from (mean - 0.5 Std.Dev.) to (mean + 0.5 Std.Dev.), where all other variables are evaluated at the mean. R-Square is the generalized coefficient of determination 
proposed by Cox and Snell (1989, pp. 208 -209). All regressions include country, industry and year dummies. The estimation is based on a simultaneous equation 
approach, following Graham and Rogers (2002) and Bartram, Brown and Fehle (2009). 
 
Panel A: OLS Results 
 
(continued) 
Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value
Derivatives -0.151 [0.00] -0.113 [0.00] -0.091 [0.00] -0.004 [0.13] -0.007 [0.04]
Gross-FX-Exposure 0.035 [0.18] 0.056 [0.00] 0.048 [0.01] -0.006 [0.04] 0.002 [0.60]
Foreign Debt 0.199 [0.00] 0.069 [0.00] -0.001 [0.96] 0.003 [0.43] 0.005 [0.23]
Leverage -0.256 [0.00] -0.589 [0.00] -0.046 [0.22] -0.020 [0.00] -0.007 [0.35]
Logsize -0.097 [0.00] 0.107 [0.00] -0.006 [0.28] -0.003 [0.00] -0.002 [0.08]
NumIndSeg -0.024 [0.00] -0.002 [0.63] -0.014 [0.00] -0.002 [0.00] -0.003 [0.00]
Dividend -1.078 [0.00] -0.468 [0.00] -0.305 [0.00] -0.044 [0.00] -0.056 [0.00]
Book-to-Market -0.050 [0.01] 0.016 [0.13] 0.002 [0.88] 0.001 [0.64] -0.001 [0.76]
LogEXIM/GDP -0.142 [0.00] -0.052 [0.00] 0.047 [0.00] -0.008 [0.00] -0.004 [0.06]
IR-Country -0.144 [0.00] -0.067 [0.00] 0.239 [0.00] 0.019 [0.00] 0.022 [0.00]
ICR-Political 0.005 [0.01] -0.012 [0.00] -0.008 [0.00] 0.001 [0.00] 0.000 [0.33]
Intercept 4.091 [0.00] 1.811 [0.00] 1.109 [0.00] 0.010 [0.65] 0.146 [0.00]
Adjusted R2 0.35 0.28 0.15 0.23 0.10
Observations 6,213       6,017       6,017        6,017       6,017       
Total Risk Exposures
Std.Dev. Beta Net-FX-Exposure Net-IR-Exposure Net-CP-Exposure
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Table 11: Examination of Risk Measures and Derivatives Use in Simultaneous Equations (continued) 
 
 
Panel B: Derivatives Use (Logit) Results 
 
 
 
Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value
Std. Dev. 0.022 [0.26]
Beta -0.170 [0.00]
Net-FX-Exposure -0.135 [0.00]
Net-IR-Exposure 0.220 [0.23]
Net-CP-Exposure -0.101 [0.49]
Coverage (3y) -0.001 [0.82] 0.000 [0.97] -0.001 [0.71] 0.000 [0.91] 0.000 [0.99]
Quick Ratio -0.074 [0.00] -0.058 [0.00] -0.071 [0.00] -0.075 [0.00] -0.074 [0.00]
Logassets 0.347 [0.00] 0.362 [0.00] 0.341 [0.00] 0.346 [0.00] 0.345 [0.00]
Dividend -0.009 [0.84] -0.106 [0.02] -0.081 [0.06] -0.043 [0.32] -0.057 [0.19]
GrossProfitMargin (3y) 0.294 [0.00] 0.275 [0.00] 0.268 [0.00] 0.282 [0.00] 0.276 [0.00]
Income Tax Credit 0.299 [0.03] 0.284 [0.04] 0.272 [0.05] 0.279 [0.04] 0.282 [0.04]
Market-to-Book*Leverage 0.171 [0.00] 0.152 [0.00] 0.158 [0.00] 0.169 [0.00] 0.165 [0.00]
Multiple Share Classes 0.310 [0.00] 0.311 [0.00] 0.324 [0.00] 0.333 [0.00] 0.334 [0.00]
Stock Options 0.409 [0.00] 0.391 [0.00] 0.391 [0.00] 0.390 [0.00] 0.393 [0.00]
PctMktCap 2.016 [0.00] 2.211 [0.00] 2.093 [0.00] 2.222 [0.00] 2.232 [0.00]
USROW -0.470 [0.00] -0.484 [0.00] -0.451 [0.00] -0.506 [0.00] -0.495 [0.00]
Intercept -3.196 [0.00] -3.163 [0.00] -3.016 [0.00] -3.234 [0.00] -3.203 [0.00]
R2 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24
Observations 6,213       6,017       6,017        6,017       6,017       
Derivatives Derivatives Derivatives Derivatives Derivatives
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Table A-1: Variable Definitions 
 
The table reports the independent variables of the study and their definition. Panel A refers to firm characteristics and 
Panel B to country-specific variables. A suffix of “(3y)” to a variable indicates a three-year average. 
 
 
(continued) 
Variable Definition
Derivatives Indicator variable with value 1 if the firm uses derivatives; 0 otherwise
FX-Derivatives Indicator variable with value 1 if the firm uses FX derivatives; 0 otherwise
IR-Derivatives Indicator variable with value 1 if the firm uses IR derivatives; 0 otherwise
CP-Derivatives Indicator variable with value 1 if the firm uses CP derivatives; 0 otherwise
Foreign Assets International Assets / Total Assets
Foreign Income (3y) International Operating Income / Operating Income
Foreign Sales International Sales / Net Sales or Revenues
Gross-FX-Exposure Indicator variable with value 1 if any foreign assets, foreign income or foreign sales are reported; 0 
Foreign Debt Indicator variable with value 1 if any foreign debt is reported; 0 otherwise
Leverage Total Debt / Size
Coverage (3y) EBIT / Interest Expense on Debt
Quick Ratio (Cash & Equivalents + Receivables (Net)) / Total Current Liabilities
NumIndSeg Number of business segments (SIC codes) that make up the company's revenue (between 1 and 8)
Logsize Natural logarithm of the sum of market capitalization, total debt and preferred stock
Logassets Natural logarithm of Total Assets
Dividend Indicator variable with value 1 if dividend yield, dividend payout or dividend per share is positive; 0 
otherwise
GrossProfitMargin (3y) Gross Income / Net Sales or Revenues
Income Tax Credit Indicator variable with value 1 if income tax credits exist; 0 otherwise
Book-to-Market Book Value Per Share / Market Price-Year End
MB*Leverage Market-to-Book* Leverage
MultShareClass Indicator variable with value 1 if currently multiple share classes exist; 0 otherwise
Stock Options Indicator variable with value 1 if stock options are reported in the annual report; 0 otherwise
Closely Held (Pct) Number of closely held shares / common shares outstanding; closely held shares are shares held by 
insiders (shares held by officers, directors and their immediate families, shares held in trust, shares of the 
company held by any other corporation (except shares held in a fiduciary capacity by banks or other financial 
institutions), shares held by pension/benefit plans, shares held by individuals who hold 5% or more of 
the outstanding shares)
Std.Dev. Ratio of the daily local currency stock return standard deviation and the local currency market index standard 
deviation
Beta Coefficient of the market index from a regression of returns on the market index, exchange rate index, 
short-term interest rate and the commodity price index on stock returns
Net-FX-Exposure Absolute value of the coefficient of exchange rate index from a regression of returns on the market index, 
exchange rate index, short-term interest rate and the commodity price index on stock returns
Net-IR-Exposure Absolute value of the coefficient of interest rate from a regression of returns on the market index, exchange 
rate index, short-term interest rate and the commodity price index on stock returns
Net-CP-Exposure Absolute value of the coefficient of commodity price index from a regression of returns on the market 
index, exchange rate index, short-term interest rate and the commodity price index on stock returns
Panel A: Firm characteristics
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Table A-1: Variable Definitions (continued) 
 
 
 
Variable Definition
IR-Country Standard deviation of short-term interest rate (1999-2001)
FX-Country Standard deviation of trade-weighted exchange rate (1999-2001)
LogEXIM/GDP Natural logarithm of ((Exports + Imports) / GDP)
ICR-Composite International Country Risk composite index
ICR-Financial International Country Risk index of financial risk (from PRS Group)
ICR-Economic International Country Risk index of economic risk (from PRS Group)
ICR-Political International Country Risk index of political risk (from PRS Group)
LogGDP Natural logarithm of GDP
Shareholder Rights Anti-Self-Dealing Index (from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2008)
Creditor Rights Aggregate index of creditor right protection with values from 0 (low) to 4 (high) (from La Porta et al., 
1998)
DerMktRank Inverse ranking of the size of the derivatives market relative to the market of the other countries in the 
sample. Size is calculated by summing daily turnover in the FX and IR markets in 2001 for non-financial 
firms and standardizing by nominal GDP. We use the rank because the unranked values are extremely 
positively skewed by countries with FX trading centers (e.g., the U.K.).
PctMktCap Percentage of market capitalization covered by the sample firms in a particular country
Year Dummy variable with value 1 if the annual report is from year 2000; 0 otherwise
Panel B: Country characteristics
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Table A-2: Summary Statistics of Derivatives Use of Sample Firms 
 
The table shows summary statistics of derivatives use by country and industry. In particular, it shows the number of firms, the percentage of firms using derivatives, the hedging 
intensity (i.e. number of different instruments), as well as derivatives usage by underlying risk and type of instrument. Panel A shows statistics by country, while Panel B shows 
statistics by industry. Other countries are Bahamas, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Egypt, Indonesia, Peru, Portugal, Turkey, and Venezuela. 
 
Panel A: Derivatives Usage by Country 
 
 
(continued)
Firms User General Forward Swap Option General Forward Swap Option General Future Swap Option
Argentina 10 70.0 2.2 70.0 40.0 20.0 0.0 60.0 0.0 40.0 30.0 40.0 0.0 20.0 30.0
Australia 301 66.4 1.6 52.2 48.5 8.6 17.9 42.2 3.7 38.9 15.0 14.3 2.0 3.7 5.0
Austria 41 56.1 1.3 56.1 43.9 17.1 22.0 22.0 0.0 17.1 7.3 7.3 2.4 4.9 2.4
Belgium 60 50.0 0.8 36.7 26.7 8.3 6.7 23.3 0.0 21.7 3.3 3.3 0.0 1.7 0.0
Brazil 16 81.3 1.2 56.3 18.8 25.0 12.5 18.8 0.0 12.5 6.3 18.8 0.0 6.3 0.0
Canada 537 60.3 1.1 46.2 34.3 8.0 8.2 27.2 0.4 24.2 3.2 17.7 2.8 5.2 5.4
Chile 13 100.0 1.8 84.6 61.5 23.1 7.7 53.8 0.0 38.5 7.7 15.4 0.0 7.7 7.7
China 32 12.5 0.2 6.3 6.3 3.1 0.0 3.1 0.0 3.1 0.0 3.1 3.1 0.0 0.0
Czech Republic 23 26.1 0.4 13.0 13.0 4.3 4.3 17.4 0.0 13.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Denmark 80 87.5 1.5 80.0 72.5 12.5 18.8 26.3 1.3 21.3 6.3 5.0 1.3 2.5 1.3
Finland 100 64.0 1.7 58.0 45.0 18.0 27.0 37.0 9.0 29.0 17.0 8.0 3.0 1.0 3.0
France 159 66.0 1.6 52.8 37.1 22.6 25.8 44.7 1.9 38.4 15.1 3.8 1.3 1.3 0.6
Germany 395 47.1 1.0 39.0 27.3 10.6 12.4 24.1 1.8 17.7 9.4 4.8 1.8 0.5 0.5
Greece 19 21.1 0.5 21.1 10.5 5.3 5.3 10.5 0.0 10.5 0.0 5.3 5.3 0.0 0.0
Hong Kong 319 23.2 0.3 18.5 13.8 4.4 1.3 7.2 0.3 5.6 1.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Hungary 15 40.0 0.8 33.3 33.3 6.7 13.3 13.3 0.0 13.3 0.0 13.3 0.0 6.7 0.0
India 40 70.0 0.9 62.5 60.0 7.5 0.0 12.5 0.0 12.5 0.0 5.0 2.5 0.0 0.0
Ireland 47 85.1 1.9 70.2 61.7 27.7 8.5 53.2 4.3 46.8 8.5 14.9 2.1 6.4 4.3
Israel 48 72.9 1.1 68.8 43.8 2.1 22.9 12.5 0.0 10.4 4.2 2.1 2.1 0.0 0.0
Italy 93 61.3 1.0 38.7 29.0 16.1 3.2 33.3 3.2 23.7 3.2 2.2 1.1 2.2 0.0
Japan 366 81.1 2.1 75.4 71.0 33.1 17.8 60.4 0.5 59.3 14.2 9.6 3.8 1.6 1.6
Korea, Republic of 24 70.8 1.3 54.2 41.7 20.8 12.5 25.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 8.3 0.0 0.0 4.2
Luxembourg 11 63.6 1.3 45.5 45.5 9.1 18.2 27.3 0.0 18.2 9.1 9.1 9.1 0.0 0.0
Malaysia 289 20.1 0.2 16.3 12.5 1.4 0.7 4.2 0.0 3.8 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.0 0.0
Mexico 35 60.0 1.2 34.3 25.7 5.7 11.4 37.1 2.9 37.1 0.0 14.3 8.6 2.9 2.9
Netherlands 131 56.5 1.2 48.1 38.9 18.3 12.2 33.6 1.5 27.5 9.2 4.6 0.8 0.8 0.8
New Zealand 39 94.9 2.6 79.5 74.4 17.9 35.9 76.9 5.1 71.8 33.3 17.9 0.0 10.3 10.3
Norway 85 67.1 1.4 56.5 48.2 17.6 17.6 29.4 2.4 24.7 5.9 8.2 2.4 0.0 3.5
Other countries 27 55.6 0.9 40.7 29.6 18.5 3.7 14.8 0.0 14.8 0.0 7.4 0.0 3.7 7.4
Philippines 12 50.0 0.8 41.7 41.7 16.7 0.0 16.7 0.0 16.7 0.0 8.3 0.0 8.3 0.0
Hedging 
Intensity
Foreign Exchange Rate Derivatives Interest Rate Derivatives Commodity Price Derivatives
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Table A-2: Summary Statistics of Derivatives Use of Sample Firms (continued) 
 
Panel A: Derivatives Usage by Country (continued) 
 
 
(continued) 
Firms User General Forward Swap Option General Forward Swap Option General Future Swap Option
Poland 11 45.5 1.1 36.4 18.2 18.2 27.3 18.2 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Singapore 219 55.3 0.8 50.7 42.5 5.9 3.7 11.4 0.5 9.6 1.8 2.3 0.0 1.8 0.0
South Africa 55 89.1 1.7 89.1 87.3 9.1 14.5 38.2 0.0 32.7 5.5 14.5 5.5 0.0 1.8
Spain 29 62.1 1.5 37.9 27.6 10.3 10.3 37.9 3.4 34.5 13.8 20.7 6.9 6.9 6.9
Sweden 135 63.7 0.9 45.2 35.6 7.4 8.1 13.3 2.2 9.6 2.2 4.4 0.7 0.7 1.5
Switzerland 119 77.3 1.6 68.1 61.3 14.3 23.5 42.9 3.4 35.3 7.6 5.9 0.8 0.8 0.8
Thailand 25 72.0 1.2 68.0 56.0 36.0 0.0 24.0 4.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
United Kingdom 860 64.4 1.3 55.0 49.4 17.1 7.8 36.5 0.6 32.1 10.8 3.7 1.5 1.4 0.7
United States 2,076 65.1 1.2 37.8 30.9 6.4 7.5 40.4 0.7 36.0 6.8 16.1 6.0 5.2 3.3
US & Canada 2,613 64.1 1.2 39.5 31.6 6.7 7.6 37.7 0.6 33.6 6.1 16.5 5.4 5.2 3.8
Europe 2,421 61.5 1.3 51.1 42.3 15.3 12.5 32.3 1.8 26.9 9.2 5.0 1.6 1.4 1.0
Asia & Pacific 1,676 51.6 1.1 44.6 39.8 12.3 8.9 27.3 1.1 25.7 7.2 6.0 1.4 1.6 1.6
Africa/Middle East 104 81.7 1.4 79.8 66.3 6.7 18.3 26.0 0.0 22.1 4.8 8.7 3.8 0.0 1.0
Latin Amer./Carib. 82 72.0 1.4 50.0 31.7 14.6 8.5 37.8 1.2 31.7 6.1 19.5 3.7 7.3 8.5
OECD 5,799 64.4 1.3 47.5 39.7 12.2 11.1 37.3 1.3 32.9 8.5 11.1 3.5 3.3 2.6
Non-OECD 1,097 39.8 0.6 34.8 28.1 5.8 3.3 10.8 0.3 9.0 1.9 3.0 0.7 0.9 0.6
United States 2,076 65.1 1.2 37.8 30.9 6.4 7.5 40.4 0.7 36.0 6.8 16.1 6.0 5.2 3.3
Non-US 4,820 58.5 1.2 48.9 40.9 13.2 10.8 29.9 1.3 26.2 7.7 7.1 1.7 1.9 1.8
All firms 6,896 60.5 1.2 45.5 37.9 11.2 9.8 33.1 1.1 29.1 7.4 9.8 3.0 2.9 2.3
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Table A-2: Summary Statistics of Derivatives Use of Sample Firms (continued) 
Panel B: Derivatives Usage by Industry 
 
 
Firms User General Forward Swap Option General Forward Swap Option General Future Swap Option
Agriculture 33 69.7 1.3 57.6 54.5 12.1 9.1 39.4 0.0 33.3 6.1 3.0 0.0 3.0 3.0
Aircraft 27 92.6 1.8 77.8 55.6 18.5 14.8 59.3 0.0 51.9 11.1 14.8 0.0 7.4 0.0
Apparel 64 70.3 1.1 56.3 45.3 6.3 10.9 31.3 0.0 26.6 6.3 3.1 1.6 1.6 1.6
Automobiles 136 77.9 1.6 69.9 59.6 20.6 16.2 40.4 1.5 40.4 8.1 6.6 2.2 0.7 0.0
Beer & Liquor 56 67.9 1.8 55.4 48.2 16.1 19.6 50.0 7.1 48.2 12.5 12.5 5.4 3.6 1.8
Books 97 57.7 1.1 43.3 39.2 8.2 10.3 35.1 2.1 30.9 15.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Business Serv. 1,078 40.8 0.6 30.0 23.7 4.1 4.8 17.3 0.3 13.9 4.1 1.5 0.4 0.2 0.2
Business Suppl. 116 74.1 1.4 58.6 49.1 10.3 15.5 44.0 1.7 37.9 10.3 10.3 1.7 4.3 0.9
Candy & Soda 32 65.6 1.6 50.0 40.6 18.8 12.5 37.5 0.0 37.5 12.5 15.6 12.5 0.0 3.1
Chemicals 173 75.7 1.8 66.5 61.8 17.3 16.2 48.6 0.6 46.2 9.2 15.6 5.2 5.2 2.9
Coal 12 58.3 1.5 50.0 50.0 8.3 16.7 33.3 0.0 33.3 8.3 16.7 8.3 0.0 8.3
Computers 285 52.6 0.9 43.5 37.2 7.7 10.2 19.6 0.4 16.5 4.2 1.1 0.7 0.0 0.0
Constr. Material 207 66.2 1.4 55.1 46.4 17.4 10.1 41.5 0.5 35.7 11.1 10.6 3.4 2.9 2.4
Construction 187 50.3 0.8 30.5 21.4 12.8 4.3 31.0 1.6 25.7 6.4 1.1 0.5 0.0 0.0
Consumer Goods 133 66.9 1.4 57.1 50.4 14.3 14.3 40.6 1.5 38.3 7.5 8.3 3.8 2.3 0.8
Defense 6 100 1.3 50.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Drugs 277 40.8 0.8 34.3 29.6 9.4 10.8 19.1 1.8 15.9 4.3 2.2 0.0 0.0 1.1
Electric. Equip. 95 60.0 1.3 51.6 46.3 12.6 10.5 34.7 1.1 28.4 6.3 11.6 5.3 2.1 0.0
Electron. Equip. 364 61.8 1.0 54.4 46.4 7.1 10.7 22.0 0.8 19.5 5.2 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.5
Entertainment 120 51.7 0.7 30.8 21.7 5.0 4.2 33.3 0.0 28.3 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Fabr. Products 21 76.2 1.4 57.1 47.6 14.3 4.8 42.9 0.0 38.1 9.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Food Products 160 66.9 1.7 47.5 39.4 20.6 10.6 45.0 3.1 42.5 8.8 21.3 17.5 2.5 3.1
Healthcare 74 50.0 0.6 16.2 12.2 1.4 1.4 27.0 0.0 27.0 6.8 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
Lab Equipment 102 75.5 1.2 66.7 54.9 8.8 17.6 30.4 1.0 27.5 3.9 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Machinery 267 76.0 1.4 67.0 60.3 10.5 15.0 36.0 1.5 31.1 7.9 4.1 0.7 1.1 0.0
Medical Equip. 115 60.9 1.1 55.7 47.0 10.4 16.5 23.5 0.9 21.7 5.2 1.7 0.0 0.9 0.0
Mines 79 58.2 1.2 46.8 40.5 7.6 12.7 21.5 0.0 20.3 3.8 27.8 3.8 3.8 8.9
Miscellaneous 45 64.4 1.3 37.8 24.4 8.9 11.1 48.9 0.0 40.0 13.3 20.0 4.4 6.7 4.4
Oil 245 71.4 1.8 38.4 31.0 10.6 8.2 39.6 1.2 35.1 5.3 50.6 15.1 26.5 12.2
Personal Serv. 48 50.0 0.8 29.2 18.8 4.2 4.2 29.2 0.0 27.1 8.3 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Precious Metals 116 56.9 1.2 35.3 25.9 1.7 8.6 14.7 0.0 10.3 3.4 45.7 0.9 3.4 22.4
Recreation 68 58.8 1.1 57.4 51.5 11.8 14.7 23.5 1.5 16.2 5.9 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.0
Restaurants 139 57.6 0.8 23.7 19.4 7.9 3.6 46.0 0.0 38.8 8.6 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Retail 379 62.0 1.1 41.4 33.5 9.8 7.4 37.7 1.1 32.7 7.7 2.9 0.5 0.5 0.3
Rubber 55 65.5 1.3 58.2 52.7 10.9 12.7 38.2 3.6 34.5 5.5 5.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
Shipping Cont. 33 66.7 1.6 45.5 36.4 21.2 6.1 48.5 0.0 36.4 12.1 24.2 12.1 6.1 3.0
Ships 13 61.5 1.4 61.5 46.2 23.1 0.0 46.2 0.0 46.2 7.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Steel 160 73.8 1.8 60.6 52.5 16.3 11.9 43.8 1.9 38.8 8.8 31.3 11.3 3.8 3.8
Telecom 303 66.3 1.3 44.9 35.3 20.1 9.2 43.9 0.7 39.6 14.5 1.0 0.3 0.0 0.0
Textiles 43 60.5 1.0 51.2 37.2 11.6 9.3 27.9 0.0 20.9 4.7 7.0 4.7 0.0 0.0
Tobacco Products 16 87.5 2.2 81.3 68.8 37.5 25.0 62.5 0.0 50.0 6.3 12.5 6.3 0.0 6.3
Transportation 272 66.2 1.5 48.5 39.3 18.0 12.5 46.3 1.5 42.6 11.0 19.1 2.6 9.6 4.8
Utilities 220 83.2 2.3 42.7 33.6 25.9 10.5 61.4 3.6 57.3 13.6 44.5 17.3 18.6 15.9
Wholesale 425 63.1 1.3 52.2 44.0 11.1 11.3 33.2 2.4 28.7 9.4 7.5 3.8 1.4 1.4
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